Three Essays in Financial Economics by Julio, Ivan F.
University of New Orleans 
ScholarWorks@UNO 
University of New Orleans Theses and 
Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 
Summer 8-6-2013 
Three Essays in Financial Economics 
Ivan F. Julio 
university of new orleans, ijulio@uno.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Julio, Ivan F., "Three Essays in Financial Economics" (2013). University of New Orleans Theses and 
Dissertations. 1716. 
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1716 
This Dissertation-Restricted is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by 
ScholarWorks@UNO with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation-Restricted in 
any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you 
need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative 
Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. 
 
This Dissertation-Restricted has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations 
by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@uno.edu. 
Three Essays in Financial Economics 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
University of New Orleans 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Financial Economics 
 
 
By 
 
Ivan Francisco Julio 
 
 
B.Sc Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, 2006 
M.Sc. Arizona State University, 2008 
 
 
August 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2013, Ivan Julio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Dedication 
 
For my parents, Carlos Cesar Julio and Lucia Cobresle who supported and encouraged 
me during their lifetime to pursue higher education and discover the sunlight pathways 
of hope and fulfillment. 
 
For my many friends who never left my side and gave me all the support I needed while 
pursing my PhD and all my professors who believed in me and cheered me on all along 
the way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Acknowledgement 
It was almost impossible for me to get this far with this research without the 
patience and assistance of many people to whom I would like to extend my sincere and 
deepest appreciation. I am grateful my family, my professors and many great friends for 
the unfailing love, kindness and support. 
I am greatly indebted to my two dissertation committee Chairs, Dr. M. Kabir 
Hassan and Dr. Neal Maroney for agreeing to supervise my work. They earned my 
special gratefulness and respect for their deep knowledge of the subject matter, patience 
and understanding. I will be indebted to them for the rest of my life especially for 
molding me into a better researcher, giving me a great deal of research and academic 
exposure and even supporting me during the toughest of times. I would like also to 
thank my dissertation committee members, Drs. Arja Turunen-Red, Gerald Whitney 
and Tarun Mukherjee, for their valuable comments and suggestions that made this 
dissertation much better. I also thank all faculty members at the Department of 
Economics and Finance from whom I learned life-long and transformational career skills. 
I extend special gratitude to Dr. Walter Lane, the Chair of the Department of 
Economics and Finance, for his continuous support as a PhD student at the University 
of New Orleans. His supportive attitude and tremendous kindness can neither be 
forgotten nor go unmentioned. 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Abstract vi 
 Chapter 1  1 
 Introduction 1 
 Related Literature  5 
 The model 9 
 Estimation results 13 
 Empirical Features of the “Recession” Measure 15 
 The data 16 
 Sorting Portfolios and Recession Risk Factor 17 
 Economic recession and risk premiums: Stocks 17 
 Estimating the Premium: Multivariate DM beta estimation using 25 Fama-French 
Size/Book-to-market portfolios 
19 
 Portfolio construction sorting by the economic recession betas 22 
 Estimating the Premium: Mutivariate DM beta estimation using all ten portfolios   25 
 Financial Recession Factor Portfolio: 10-1 portfolio 29 
 Conclusions 31 
 References 31 
 Chapter 2 36 
 Introduction 36 
 Data Description 38 
 Methodology 44 
 Momentum Strategies 45 
 Contrarian Strategies 49 
 Conclusion 53 
 References 54 
 Chapter 3 56 
 Introduction 56 
 The model 60 
 Networks Notation and Specification of the Model 61 
 Cost Structure and Collaboration Alliances 62 
 Payoffs 63 
 Networks Stability 64 
 Efficiency 64 
 Symmetric Networks 65 
 Independent Markets Case 65 
 Homogeneous-product oligopoly 67 
 Application: The Monti-Klein Model of Banking in a Network Approach 70 
 Independent Markets Case 71 
 Monetary Policy and Banking Collaborative Networks 77 
 Oligopolistic Banking and Sharing Credit Information Alliances 78 
 Monetary Policy and Banking Collaborative Networks 81 
 Conclusion 82 
 References 83 
 Vita 85 
 
 
vi 
 
 
Abstract 
Chapter 1. Campbell and Cochrane (CC, 1999) argue that their habit formation 
based stochastic discount factor is a recession state variable. In recessions, consumption 
falls closer to habit and both risk aversion and risk premia rise.  The connection 
between discount factor and risk premia is more pronounced in bad times.  Using the 
CC habit formation approach we construct a “recession” risk factor and tests the 
significance of this factor in the cross-section of asset returns, based on factor 
innovations and portfolios based on factor covariances.   
Chapter 2. We investigate the profitability of momentum and contrarian 
portfolio strategies in a cross-section of broad futures markets. We identify 16 profitable 
momentum strategies that earn 33.64% average return a year and 16 profitable 
contrarian strategies that earn 10.69% average return a year. Overall, this indicates that 
relative-strength and contrarian strategies perform better on a risk-adjusted basis than 
passive long-only strategies in equity and futures markets, making futures markets 
contracts attractive candidates to be included in well-diversified portfolios.  
Chapter 3. Banks face adverse selection or moral hazard problems in its lending 
activity that may lead to an inefficient allocation of credit which can be mitigated by 
expensive screening credit applications and by monitoring borrowers. A cheaper and 
more effective way to acquire information is by exchanging it with other lenders. We 
model information sharing in the banking industry within a network framework that 
provide us with some useful insights on the optimal number of credit sharing 
information alliances individual banks should establish to maximize expected profits. 
We find that if banks operate in independent markets, then it is optimal that each bank 
shares credit information with all the other banks. This is in line with the tendency of 
credit bureaus to be totally integrated in a few big credit agencies. In a homogeneous 
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loan market, where banks compete a la Cournot, banks’ profits are maximized at an 
intermediate level of sharing credit information. This provides an alternative 
explanation for why we observe syndicated loans even in countries in which formal 
sharing information systems are well established.  
 
Key Words: habit formation models, risk premia, factor models, futures markets, 
trading strategies, network theory, banking. 
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Chapter 1:  
Recession Risk Factor and the Cross-section of Expected Stock Returns 
1. Introduction 
 There is no doubt that the consumption based asset pricing paradigm focused on the 
representative agent formulation is one of the major advances in financial economics theory 
during the last three decades. The seminal contribution of Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979), 
Grossman and Shiller (1981), show how consumption/saving decisions are linked to the 
equilibrium price of assets.  
Unfortunately, the standard consumption-based model has been an empirical failure. The model 
has been mostly rejected using U.S. data in its representative agent formulation with time-
separable power utility (Hansen and Singleton 1982, 1983). Moreover, it has performed no better 
and often worse than the simple static-CAPM [Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) ] in explaining the 
cross-sectional pattern of asset returns. Campbell and Cochrane (2000) show in an explicit 
quantitative example that, in fact, portfolio-based models can outperform the canonical 
consumption-based model by the amount we see in the data, even when a slightly more complex 
consumption-based model holds by construction. 
  The consumption-based model has failed at explaining a number of asset pricing 
phenomena, including the high market Sharpe ratio (ratio of equity premium to the standard 
deviation of stock returns) simultaneously with stable aggregate consumption growth, the high 
level and volatility of the stock market returns, the low and relatively constant interest rates, 
the cross-sectional variation in expected portfolio returns, and the predictability of excess stock 
market returns over medium to long-horizon.  
 From all these failures, the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle are the 
two failures in particular that have attracted most of the attention among financial economists. 
Since the work of Mehra and Prescott (1986) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), researchers 
have altered the standard consumption-based models by workings backwards to some extent, 
characterizing the properties that discount factors must have in order to explain asset return 
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data. Mainly, the modeling has been driven by the fact that we know that the stochastic 
discount factor had to be exceptionally volatile, while not too conditionally volatile and that the 
risk-free rate had to be relatively stable (Cochrane, (2001)). 
 The habit-formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), building on work by Abel 
(1990) and Constantinides (1990), attack the equity premium and the risk free rate puzzle by 
modifying the representative agent’s preferences. In particular, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) 
add a slow moving habit formation to the standard power utility function to obtain a 
consumption-based model which has some hope of explaining asset pricing data. They showed 
that high stock market volatility and predictability could be explained by a small amount of 
aggregate consumption volatility if it were amplified by time-varying risk aversion. 
 The main idea behind external habit formation models is that agents get used to a 
certain standard of living, which depends on the consumption of some exterior reference group, 
typically per capita aggregate consumption and that their overall well-being depends on how 
much can be consumed relative to this reference level. Thus, people are more risk averse as 
consumption and wealth decrease in a recession relative to some “habit” or the recent past. 
 From the empirical research of risk premia and expected returns over the business cycle 
we know that expected stock returns are related to the business cycles as shown in papers by 
Fama (1990), Fama and French (1989) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1990). The later show that 
standard models with time-separable utility and exogenous endowment processes have a 
tendency to generate procyclical expected returns, which is at odds with the data that identifies 
risk premia as countercyclical - higher in recession when people are less willing to take 
systematic risks and lower in booms. The time-variation of risk premia remain as a central 
empirical fact that had to be linked to the pervasive business cycle. Clearly, the challenge is to 
choose a theory with coherent empirical prediction that tell us how to measure bad economic 
times and times of high risk premia. 
 In his 2011 AFA presidential address, John Cochrane (2011), highlights the importance 
of theories that link what he calls discount rates (risk premia) to macroeconomic events. Risk 
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premia are high for those assets that tend to pay off poorly in bad economic times. Campbell 
and Cochrane’s (1999) model looks promising at explaining these characteristics of asset pricing 
and aggregate economic performance. As bad shocks drive consumption down towards the habit 
level, risk aversion rises, stock prices decline, and expected returns rise. Since, habit adjusts 
slowly to consumption this means that at sufficient longer horizons the model has the ability to 
separates a fear of consumption declines from the stronger event fear of recession.  
 The following figure show in advance how the Campbell-Cochrane habit-based model to 
be presented in section 2 has the potential to explain the pattern followed by asset prices, even 
in the unusual event of a financial crisis. Figure 1 presents the surplus consumption ratio 
              inferred from the habit specification model, where    is the habit level. 
Obviously, when consumption,    gets close to the habit level,    the investor/consumer is 
worse off. As we will see, the model predicts that the price-dividend ratio is a nearly log-linear 
function of the surplus consumption ratio (the only state variable of the model).  
Figure 1. Surplus consumption and stock prices.  
 This figure plots the surplus consumption ratio and the S&P 500 price/dividend ratio. 
The surplus consumption ratio,              , captures the relation between consumption, 
   and habit levels,   , in which habit moves slowly in response to changes in consumption. The 
surplus consumption ratio increases with consumption.     , corresponds to an extremely bad 
state in which consumption is equal to habit; on the other hand,      corresponds to an 
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extremely  good state in which consumption rises relative to habit.
  
  We can observe that the general pattern is astonishingly good: when the surplus 
consumption ratio fell, stock prices fell. This is in contrast with the well known empirical failure 
of most of the standard consumption-based models, i.e. the actual low correlation between stock 
returns and consumption growth described by Cochrane and Hansen (1992). Thus, it seems that 
by introducing a small friction in the equilibrium consumption-based model, i.e. slow moving 
habits in the utility function, we can check or test the implication that consumption growth and 
stock expected returns are highly correlated with the surplus consumption ratio with some hope 
that the model will be useful explain asset return in a large cross-section of asset returns, and 
not only to match the variables at an aggregate level. 
 The model has changed the way we think about  risk premia.  Under the model’s 
assumptions, the consumer will require a higher risk premia in times of low surplus consumption 
1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Surplus Consumption and P/D ratio 
S
P/D
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ratio. The habit model captures the fundamental idea that consumers become more risk averse 
as consumption drops during recessions. In this sense, variation across assets in expected returns 
is driven mainly by variation across assets in covariances with recessions far more than by 
variation across assets in covariances with consumption growth (Campbell and Cochrane, 
(1999)).  
Surprisingly, few articles have tried to estimate and test the Campbell-Cochrane habit utility 
function on a cross section of stock returns, like for example in the Fama–French 25 size and 
book-to-market portfolios (Cochrane, 2008). The closest exception is Chen and Ludvigson (2009) 
which we summarized in the related literature section. The goal of this article is to construct a 
“recession factor” using the CC habit formation approach and test the significance of this factor 
in the cross-section of asset returns, based on factor innovations and portfolios based on factor 
covariances.  In other words, this essay argues that the covariance between asset returns and 
the recession factor drives expected returns. 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 As Cochrane (2008) argue, surprisingly, few articles have tried to estimate and test the 
Campbell-Cochrane habit utility function on a cross section of stock returns, like for example in 
the Fama–French 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. The closest exception is Chen and 
Ludvigson (2009). They pursue a semiparametric approach treating the functional form of the 
habit as unknown, and estimating it along with the finite dimensional parameters of the power 
utility function. Comparing models based on Hansen–Jagannathan (1997) distance, which is a 
sum of squared pricing errors weighted by the inverse of the second-moment matrix of returns, 
they find that the resulting internal habit SDF proxy can explain a cross-section of 6 size and 
book-market sorted portfolio equity returns better than the Fama–French three-factor model. 
Their empirical results also indicate that the estimated habit function is nonlinear and that 
habit formation is better described as internal rather than external habit formation. In the 
internal habit formation case, the habit is a function of the agent’s own past consumption while 
in models of external habit formation the habit depends on the consumption of some exterior 
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reference group, called by Abel (1990) “catching up with the Joneses”, typically per capita 
aggregate consumption. In other structures, internal and external habits are observationally 
indistinguishable (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), however, determining which form of habit 
formation is more empirically plausible might be important because the two specifications can 
have different implications for optimal tax policy and welfare analysis (Ljungqvist  and Uhlig 
(2000)).  
 Tallarini and Zhang (2005) estimate the model proposed by Campbell and Cochrane 
(1999) and examine the cyclical behavior of expected stock returns in an equilibrium asset 
pricing model in which agents’ preferences have an unobserved external habit using the efficient 
method of moments (EMM). The model, however, is still rejected at the 1% level. While the 
model performs reasonably well in matching the mean of returns, it fails to capture the higher-
order moments. 
 Using GMM, Fillat and Garduno (2005) estimate and test the CC (1999) model under 
three different market settings: (1) complete consumption insurance, using aggregate 
consumption data, (2) limited stock market participation, using household-level data and (3) 
incomplete markets. They find that regardless of the market setting the model is rejected as it 
fails the null hypothesis that the Euler equation holds. However, they observed that the setting 
that better explains average stocks returns is the one with complete markets. 
 Santos and Veronesi (2010) argue based on a theoretical grounds that non-linear external 
habit persistence models generate counterfactual predictions in the cross-section of stock returns. 
In particular, they show that in the absence of cross-sectional heterogeneity in firms’ cash-flow 
risk, these models produce a ‘‘growth premium’’. This implication is in conflict with the well-
established empirical observation of a ‘‘value premium’’. However, the substantial heterogeneity 
in firms’ cash-flow risk needed to generate both a value premium as well as most of the stylized 
facts about the cross-section of equity returns generates a ‘‘cash-flow risk puzzle’’ in the sense 
that value stocks must have an implausible cash-flow risk compared to the data to correct for 
the growth premium. 
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 Lawrence, Geppert and Prakash (2009) paper tests whether the Campbell and Cochrane 
(1999) habit utility model generates a valid stochastic discount factor for the 25 Fama-French 
size/book-to-market and size/momentum sorted portfolios using quarterly consumption data. 
They test their model using the methodology of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and Burnside 
(1994). They find that for reasonable parameter values, the model’s stochastic discount factor is 
inside the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds and therefore satisfies the necessary conditions for a 
valid stochastic discount factor. 
 This article takes a different approach to estimate and test the Campbell-Cochrane habit 
utility function model. First, we derive a valid a valid stochastic discount factor from the 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit utility model. Then, using this discount factor we 
construct a “recession factor” and test if this new factor can explain the 25 Fama-French 
size/book-to-market and size/momentum sorted portfolios using monthly consumption data. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the Campbell and Cochrane 
habit utility model. We provide details on the data and the construction of our recession factor 
(Stochastic Discount Factor) in Section 3 and in Section 4 we present details of the results. We 
discuss the results in Section 5 and the paper ends with a brief conclusion, as Section 6. 
2. The model  
Assume that the discount factor or sdf,  , and gross returns,      are jointly lognormal 
distributed.  
               [ 
        ]      [ 
             ]      [ 
       ] 
 
Define        and                                     . Using the normal 
property                
     we have  
               [ 
       ]       
        
 
 [    
        ] 
Then the law of one price states that 
8 
 
               [ 
       ]       
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                    ]     
where      which rules out under or over pricing.  Taking logs we find 
       [    ]                    
 
 
[    
          
                    ]    
  
where small letters denote logs and defining   
         .  
The risk free rate is given by 
     
 
        
 
Then the log of the risk free rate is,  
       (    )    (
 
        
)     (        )                  
      
Combining now, expected returns are,  
                
        
                    
The variance term is from Jensen's Inequality.  The form of sdf,    , in the covariance 
term either is derived from projection on returns data or the intertemporal marginal 
rate of substitution (IRMS) of a specific utility framework.  
     ( 
      
         
) 
Campbell and Cochrane (CC,1999) derive sdf,     , from a Habit formation utility and log 
normality where model agents maximize the utility 
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  ∑  
       
     
   
 
   
 (A5) 
where    the level of habit that responds slowly to past consumption,   is the time 
preference, and   is a curvature parameter.  This framework offers much richer 
dynamics than the standard utility model such as time varying risk premia and uses 
local curvature of the utility function to increase the volatility of the discount factor 
which is key to success to pricing assets for which conventional models fall woefully 
short.  For convenience, utility is recast in terms of the surplus consumption ratio  
    
     
  
   {   } (A6) 
where if it goes to zero consumption becomes equal to habit. it is easier to model the log 
of this ratio instead of modeling    itself.  The surplus consumption ratio is also called 
the "recession" state variable as "good" and "bad" states are defined by how far 
consumption strays from habit.    
CC  assume that log consumption follows a random walk with drift   and an 
       innovation   , 
                            (A7) 
CC model Log    as an AR(1) square root process: 
          ̅                  (A8a) 
            ̅                  (A8b) 
where  ̅   √      ⁄  is the steady state value of the surplus consumption ratio. The 
parameter    governs the persistence of the log surplus consumption ratio, while the 
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sensitivity function          control the sensitivity of      and thus of log habit      to 
innovations in consumption growth    . 
The sensitivity function is 
          
 
 ̅
√          ̅                                  (A9a) 
where 
       ̅        ̅
   (A9b) 
The features of this process ensure consumption remains above habit, habit 
moves positivity with consumption, a countercyclic price of risk, habit has no influence 
on steady state consumption growth, and a constant risk free rate. 
The specific sdf is placed into the generic present value relation:   
 
    
    
     (  
 
  
  
)      (  
 
    
  
  )               
(A10a
) 
where      is the nominal price of the payoff    divided by the price levels at each date 
and    is the nominal gross return and the nominal for of the habit formation discount 
factor is 
     (
  
    
  
    
)
      
  
     [       ]    
(A10b
) 
Let inflation also be i.i.d.: 
                     (    
 ) (#) 
Now the Log discount factor is 
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with expectation and deviation are respectively 
 
                [       ̅         ]    
                  [         ]      
(#) 
and variance 
 
    
          [           ]
      [  [         ]     ]
  
   [         ]
   
    
     [         ]         
       (          ̅ )    
     [         ]         
(#) 
and log of the expected value is 
 
  (        )           
 
 
    
     
               ̅            
 
 
 
(      (          ̅ )    
     [         ]        ) 
            
 
 
       
 
 
  
    [         ]         
(#) 
with risk free rate  
 
        (        )
             
 
 
       
 
 
  
    [         ]         
(#) 
that is constant if real consumption growth and inflation are uncorrelated 
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         (        )              
 
 
       
 
 
  
  (#) 
The covariance term is  
                   [           ][           ]  
 
 
                  [   [         ]      (           )] 
   [         ]                        
   [         ]                  
(#) 
 
                 
        
       [         ]                 . (#) 
 
            √    [         ]                                 (#) 
Because the expectation involve the conditional variance we pick the root that yields 
expected returns under 100%.  The expost formulation used in estimation is 
            [           ]
   [         ]              (#) 
            [           ]
           (#) 
 
with risk free 
                               
    [         ]    +   (#) 
The standard CRRA model results if          , and    .   
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There are certainly many ways to parameterize our sdf    to match the average market rate of 
return and risk premium over the last 50 years.  For convenience, we estimate the following 
moment conditions:  
  [
  
  
]  [
 
 
]  (#) 
where   is the value weighted CRSP index return,      is the 1-month t-bill rate as given 
by Kenneth French's website. The sdf     is constructed (eqs. A10) from monthly real 
percapita personal consumption without durables and the price index of all personal 
consumption expenditures for computing real consumption and inflation.  The 
parameters   and   are estimated and   is held constant.   
The starting value for surplus consumption is held at its steady state value      ̅  and 
updated with changes in   with the consumption growth mean,  ,  and its standard deviation , 
  
 , coming come from time series data.  The moment conditions are then iterated until 
parameters and the process for surplus consumption converges.   
The first moment condition guarantees the discount factor reproduces the average rate on the 
market, but does not fix the premium.  The second moment is the definition of the risk free rate 
which then fixes the premium.  In the spirit of minimum variance, the persistence parameter   
is chosen to maximize the Sharpe ratio 
     
     
 or the variance of the discount factor 
  
  
 needed to 
price the market and still fit the risk premium.1   
3. Estimation results 
 In the following figure, we can see how expected excess stock returns (risk premia) and 
realized excess returns are related to the business cycles. Shaded areas indicated US recessions. 
                                                          
1
 We tried to estimate the system with a third moment condition to fix the Sharpe ratio and estimate   
from:     ⁄    , but found it gave two solutions because the steady state value of surplus consumption is a 
function of both   and   and variance of the discount factor is affected by both. Higher value of   dampens 
variance resulting in failure to converge if the value is too high for the system to fit both conditions. 
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Note that the risk premia derived from the habit formation model increase in every period in 
which the economy had enter in a recession period. Campbell and Cochrane’s (1999) model 
shows that as consumption drops towards the habit level, risk aversion rises, stock prices 
decline, and risk premia rise. Since, habit adjusts slowly to consumption this means that at 
sufficient longer horizons the model has the ability to separates a fear of consumption declines 
from the stronger event fear of recession.  
 
 Moreover, the increase in risk premia we observed in bad economic times is inversely 
related to the actual excess return given by the ten-year rolling average CRSP value-weighted 
market excess return.  To see what this is the case, imagine an average investor of the type buy 
and hold for the covered period 1969-2009.  In a period of recession, actual excess return must 
necessarily fall (stock prices drops) in order for the risk premia to rise. If stock prices fall, we 
15 
 
expect long run investors to run in and buy. The graphs suggests why they do not - their 
discount rate (or the expected risk premia ) rises in a recession. 
Empirical Features of the “Recession” Measure 
 As illustrated below, the One interesting characteristic of the recession series plotted in 
the next figure are its occasional upward spikes, indicating months with especially high 
estimated recession risk. Many of these spikes occur during market downturns. 
 
 
 A negative shock to consumption growth means less consumption is around at date=t 
than expected leading to a higher actual price (i.e., higher marginal utility) at this date 
corresponding to the positive deviations during recession in the graph.    
 The largest upward spike in our measure of recession risk occurs in December 2008, after 
the bursting of the housing bubble in the summer of 2007 that lead to a run in the so called 
shadow banking system (Gorton, 2010). While the overall mortgage losses are large on an 
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absolute scale, they are still relatively modest compared to the $8 trillion of U.S. stock market 
wealth lost between October 2007, when the stock market reached an all-time high, and October 
2008 (Brunnermeier, 2008).  
 If that panic had not occurred, it is likely that any economic contraction following the 
housing bust would have been no worse than the mild 2001 recession that followed the dot-com 
bust (Cochrane, 2008) which coincided with the sharp rise of the estimated recession risk in 
September, 2001. In the same way, the recession of 1990 associated with the invasion of Kuwait 
by Iraq have an increase on the recession risk of the same magnitude. The second largest spike 
is early, 1980’s associated with the disinflationary twin recessions. The Third largest positive 
value in our measure of recession risk is in the recession of 1973-5, associated with the first 
OPEC price increases (Stock and Watson, 1999).  In the other hand, we can see that the 
negative values for our measure of recession risk is correspond to the long expansions of the 
1980’s and the early 1990’s. 
The Data 
Consumption Data: Several studies use quarterly US consumption data because it contains 
fewer measurement errors than monthly consumption data. See Ferson and Constantinides 
(1991) and Heaton (1995) for more details. However, to be consistent with the empirical 
literature on the cross-section of returns, we use consumption at a monthly frequency. We 
measure aggregate consumption data as seasonally adjusted monthly expenditures on non-
durable goods and services. Personal consumption per capita is obtained by dividing the 
aggregate by a monthly measure of the US population. Finally, real per capita consumption is 
obtained by dividing the latter by the monthly price index for personal consumption 
expenditures (base 2005=100) , all of which were obtained from records of the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and the Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The size of 
the sample in this case is the biggest, such that data were available for consumption, 
population, returns, and inflation ranging from 
January 1959 to December 2009. 
Asset Returns: For asset returns we use the following US monthly data: Six size/book-market 
portfolio returns from January 1959 to December 2009. The portfolios are constructed at the 
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end of each June, are the intersections of two portfolios formed on size (market equity, ME) and 
three portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity (BE/ME). The size 
breakpoint for year   is the median NYSE market equity at the end of June of year  . BE/ME 
for June of year   is the book equity for the last fiscal year end in     divided by ME for 
December of    . The BE/ME breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. Data is 
taken from Kenneth French’s website: http 
://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html. 
 In addition, we reevaluate the model using 25 size/book-market portfolio returns from 
January 1959 to December 2009. 
Sorting Portfolios and Recession Risk Factor 
We argue that recession risk is in fact a priced factor and we expect that the risk premium 
associated with it to be quantitatively significant. Following the empirical literature, we now 
routinely form portfolios by sorting them by some characteristic, in particular by the covariance 
between stock returns and the recession factor derived from the habit formation model. Then we 
run time-series regressions like CAPM or Fama and French’s to see which factors explain the 
spread in average returns, as revealed by small regression intercepts. 
In other words, we ask the question whether a stock’s expected return is related to the 
sensitivity of its return to the innovation in our recession factor derived from the habit 
formation stochastic discount factor,   . That sensitivity, denoted for stock   by its loading 
factor   
    is the slope coefficient on     in a multiple regression in which the other 
independent variables are additional factors given by different models of asset pricing.  
Economic recession and risk premiums: Stocks 
In this section we investigate whether our economic recession risk is a priced state variable. In 
particular we test whether    is related to the cross-section of U.S. portfolio returns. In others 
words, we explore whether there is evidence consistent with the well-known fact that investors 
find economic downturn undesirable. We expect that investors will require a compensation for 
holding stock portfolios with greater exposure to that risk, i.e., performing more poorly in bad 
economic times. 
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In our discussion above we argued that the expected-return premium associated with the 
recession risk is positive. Here we explore this conjecture by employing the multivariate asset 
pricing model in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). This model allows assessing the marginal 
contribution of DM to the cross-section of equity portfolio returns while accounting for their 
sensitivities to other factors. 
Define the multivariate regression for each portfolio   as: 
           
                
where    is a     vector containing the excess returns on the  ’s portfolios,    is a      
vector containing the realizations of the “traded" factors, i.e. MKT, SMB, HML and MOM.   is 
a     matrix of factor loadings, and    and  
   are     vectors. In our case, we also 
consider a specification with only Fama-French three traded factors, excluding MOM.  
Assuming that the   portfolios are priced by the returns’ sensitivities to the traded factors and 
the non-traded recession factor, we would expect that 
           
          
However, like Pastor and Stambaugh, we argue that while the vector of premia on the traded 
factors,   ¸ is equal to      , the economic recession factor     is not the payoff on a traded 
position, so in general the recession risk premium     is not equal to       ,           . 
Now, taking expectations of both sides of equation (#)  
                 
           
and substituting from equation (15)  gives 
           
              
      
Since          and          in general, we obtain the following restriction  
    
          
     
or equivalently,  
    
  [          ]      
19 
 
We estimate     using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982). Let    
denote the set of unknown parameters:             
            and          , where     
       parameters and                is a     vector of functions of   and data     
called a moment function, specifically we define       as: 
      [
     
          
]       
where 
  
  [   
    ] 
       
 [          ]       
           
Let’s define also  ̅     (
 
 
)∑      
 
    as the sample mean of      . Then, the GMM estimator 
of   minimizes  ∑  ̅ ( ̃)
  
    ̂ 
   ̅ ( ̃) where  ̂  is a consistent estimator of the weighting 
matrix.2 
Estimating the Premium: Multivariate DM beta estimation using 25 Fama-French Size/Book-
to-market portfolios 
We begin by studying the exposure of US 25 equity market portfolios formed to 25 U.S. 
portfolios formed on size (market equity) and book-to-market (book equity to market equity), 
from French’s website to the economic recession risk factor, via the multivariate GMM 
procedure we have just described.  
We explore if our measure of recession risk is able to priced popular traded portfolios, like the 
25 Fama-French Size/Book-to-market portfolios. Specifically, Table 1 reports GMM estimates 
of     when accounting for the sensitivity of these portfolios’ excess returns to the three traded 
Fama-French factors (U.S. market [MKT], size [SMB], and book-to-market [HML]) and four 
traded factors (Fama-French 3 factors plus momentum [MOM]), over the full sample 1967-2009 
and two sub-periods (1967-1988, 1989-2009).  
                                                          
2
 Hansen (1982) showed that when the      are independent over  ,  ̂    ( ̂)  
 
 
∑   ( ̂)  ( ̂)
  
    is 
a consistent estimator of the weighting matrix wherer  ̂ is any consistent estimator 
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The table reports estimates of annualized percentage of the risk premium (   , multiplied by 
12) associated with the DM recession factor for multivariate DM betas (  
   ) of both value- 
(Panel A) and equal-weighted (Panel B) 25 US portfolios formed on size (market equity) and 
book-to-market (book equity-to-market equity.  
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Table 1. DM Recession risk premiums and its contribution to the FF 25 US portfolios formed on size (market equity) and book-to-
market (book equity-to-market equity) Expected Return 
This table reports estimates of annualized percentage of the risk premium (   , multiplied by 12) associated with the DM recession factor for 
multivariate DM betas (  
   ) of value- (Panel A) and equal-weighted (Panel B) 25 US portfolios formed on size (market equity) and book-to-
market (book equity-to-market equity), from French’s website. Specifically, the table reports GMM estimates of     when accounting for the 
sensitivity of these portfolios’ excess returns to the three traded Fama-French factors (U.S. market [MKT], size [SMB], and book-to-market [HML]) 
and four traded factors (Fama-French 3 factors plus momentum [MOM]), over the full sample 1967-2009 and two sub-periods (1967-1988, 1989-
2009). We also report estimates of risk premiums per average    beta (       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) and for the 10-1 spread portfolio (going long decile 10 stocks and 
short decile 1 stocks,        
     
   ). Besides, the estimates of the risk premium associated with the recession factor     the table also reports 
the estimates of risk premiums per average    beta (       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅). The premium is reported as a monthly value multiplied by 1,200, so that the 
product of the average recession beta and the reported premium can be interpreted as the annual percentage return. The asymptotic t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.  -test is the asymptotic chi-square statistic for the over-identifying restriction; the 
corresponding p-values are below. 
  
1967 - 2009 
 
1967 - 1988 
 
1989 - 2009 
  
FF 3 Factor FF 4 Factor   FF 3 Factor FF 4 Factor   FF 3 Factor FF 4 Factor 
  
Panel A: Value-weighted portfolios 
     
0.12 0.84 
 
0.25 0.29 
 
4.73 6.64 
  
(1.95) (1.64) 
 
(1.95) (2.11) 
 
(7.73) (6.95) 
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
0.15 0.38 
 
0.32 0.38 
 
0.77 0.78 
  
(1.95) (1.69) 
 
(1.92) (2.05) 
 
(4.71) (3.18) 
       
 
24.57 87.88 
 
34.96 27.85 
 
27.67 30.12 
  
(0.99) (0.13) 
 
(0.99) (0.99) 
 
(0.99) (0.98) 
  
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolios 
     
10.60 11.46 
 
0.49 2.75 
 
10.69 42.61 
  
(7.04) (5.92) 
 
(2.08) (2.99) 
 
(13.42) (2.62) 
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
0.77 2.27 
 
0.59 1.18 
 
0.72 2.99 
  
(1.86) (4.93) 
 
(2.13) (2.87) 
 
(1.95) (2.91) 
       
 
37.10 38.11 
 
53.92 26.69 
 
19.82 11.08 
  
(0.89) (0.87) 
 
(0.96) (0.32) 
 
(0.99) (0.99) 
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The full-period estimate of     is significantly positive for both sets of portfolios under both 
specifications (three traded factors or four). Notice that the estimates of annualized percentage 
of the risk premium is substantially higher for equal-weighted than for value weighted portfolios 
for all the periods considered. For instance, for the period 1967-2009     ranges between 10.60% 
and 11.46% for the equal-weighted portfolio using a three- factor and a four-factor model 
respectively. On the other hand, for the same period,      ranges between 0.12% and 0.84% 
annual for the value-weighted portfolio. The subperiod estimates are all positive, and the 
majorities are statistically significant. 
We also report estimates of risk premiums per average    beta (       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) as a monthly value 
multiplied by 1,200, so that the product of the average recession beta and the reported premium 
can be interpreted as the annual percentage return. For instance, DM recession risk premiums 
per average    beta range between 0.59% and almost 3% annual for all the period considered 
for the equal-weighted portfolio. 
Portfolio construction sorting by the economic recession betas 
Motivated by the evidence in the previous section, we follow a portfolio-based approach similar 
to the one in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) to construct a financial recession factor.  At the end 
of every year of our sample, starting with 1967, we sort all stocks into ten portfolios based on 
stocks’ estimated    betas over the previous three years of monthly returns continuing through 
the current year end. We then regress the ensuing stacked, post-formation returns on the 
following standard asset pricing factors. According to the literature, estimated nonzero alphas 
would suggest that    betas explain a component of expected stock returns not captured by 
standard factor loadings. 
Our dataset comes from the monthly tape of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
It comprises monthly stock returns and values for all domestic ordinary common stocks (CRSP 
share codes 10 and 11) traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ between January 1, 1967 
and December 31, 2009, with at least three years of monthly returns continuing through the 
current year end and with the restriction that stock prices should be between $5 and $1,000. At 
the end of each year (e.g., on month k), for each stock   with at least 36 months of available 
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data through k we estimate its    beta as the slope coefficient   
   in the following 
multivariate regression of its monthly excess return     : 
       
    
         
   [    ]    
   [    ]    
   [    ]    
           
where        , and     are the popular market, size, and book-to-market traded factors of 
Fama and French (1993);     is the traded momentum factor and    is our economic 
recession factor,    derived from the CC habit formation model. 
We then sort all stocks by their pre-ranking, historical    betas into ten portfolios (from the 
lowest, 1, to the highest, 10), and compute their value-weighted returns for the next twelve 
months. The resulting value-weighted decile portfolio returns for the next 12 months are stacked 
across years to generate post-ranking return series. Equally-weighted portfolios yield similar 
inference. 
Unfortunately, as we can observed in Panel A of Table 2, the post-ranking recession betas do 
not follow a monotonic pattern across deciles, which is not consistent with the objective of the 
sorting procedure.  The “10–1” spread, which goes long decile 10 (stocks with high recession 
betas) and short decile 1 (stocks with low recession betas), has a recession beta of 0.15, for the 
sub-period 1967-1988 with a t-statistic of 0.94. However, this suggest that beta might be time 
varying. Therefore, the coefficients used in the sort procedure are not stable over time.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports some additional properties of portfolios sorted by historical recession 
betas. It reports the decile portfolios’ betas with respect to the Fama-French factors, MKT, 
SMB, and HML, and the previously described momentum
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Table 2. Properties of value-weighted portfolios of U.S. stocks sorted on historical DM recession betas 
This table reports post-ranking properties of value-weighted portfolios of U.S. stocks sorted by their historical DM recession betas into ten equal 
portfolios from the lowest (1) to the highest (10), as well as for the 10-1 spread portfolio going long decile 10 stocks and short decile 1 stocks, over 
the full sample 1967-2009 and two sub-periods (1967-1988, 1989-2009). Eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least three years of monthly returns continuing through the current year end and with stock prices between $5 and 
$1,000. Stocks then are sorted in ten deciles of their historical MD recession betas   
   from a multivariate regression of their percentage monthly 
excess returns on our economic recession factor,   , the three traded Fama-French factors (U.S. market [MKT], size [SMB], and book-to-market 
[HML], from French’s website), and the traded momentum factor (MOM, also from French’s website). The resulting value-weighted decile portfolio 
returns for the next 12 months are stacked across years to generate post-ranking return series. Panel A reports their estimated post-ranking MDI 
betas from the aforementioned multivariate regression model. Panel B reports the time-series mean of each of these portfolios’ value-weighted 
average of their post-ranking factor betas. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
  Decile Portolio 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 
 
Panel A: Post- Ranking DM betas 
1967-2009 0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 
 
(0.66) (0.24) (-0.69) (0.78) (0.84) (-0.51) (0.08) (-1.03) (-0.52) (0.22) (-0.26) 
1967-1988 0.15 0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.29 0.15 
 
(1.35) (0.74) (-0.23) (0.71) (0.59) (0.10) (-0.14) (-0.57) (-0.40) (2.55) (0.94) 
1989-2009 -0.23 -0.03 -0.08 0.14 0.18 -0.10 0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.55 -0.31 
 
(-1.21) (0.19) (-0.43) (0.84) (1.20) (-0.56) (0.59) (-0.64) (-0.57) (-2.29) (-1.02) 
 
Panel B: Additional Properties, January 1967-November 2009 
MKT beta 1.03 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.94 1.05 0.02 
 
(57.91) (57.31) (53.65) (54.12) (56.35) (55.91) (55.62) (57.77) (52.99) (49.91) (0.66) 
SMB beta 0.60 0.38 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.39 0.55 -0.05 
 
(24.58) (16.74) (12.42) (12.79) (14.85) (11.94) (13.71) (13.79) (16.05) (19.21) (-1.23) 
HML beta 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.08 -0.07 
 
(5.69) (10.89) (12.11) (13.38) (14.47) (12.84) (13.10) (11.92) (8.07) (2.57) (-1.72) 
MOM beta -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.07 
  (-5.24) (-5.40) (-5.61) (-4.85) (-3.97) (-5.57) (-4.05) (-3.29) (-4.36) (-0.95) (2.66) 
25 
 
factor, MOM. The Fama-French and momentum betas are estimated by regressing the decile 
excess returns on the returns of the four-factor portfolios. Two of the three Fama-French betas 
of the 10–1 spread are significantly negative: -0.05 for SMB, and -0.07 for HML. The HML betas 
indicate that the 10–1 spread has a tilt toward growth stocks. The 10–1 spread’s momentum 
beta is significantly positive (0.07), suggesting some tilt toward past winners. 
Alphas  
From our previous discussion, we infer that if our recession risk factor is priced, we should 
observed systematic differences in the mean returns of our    beta-sorted portfolios. The 
evidence in table 3 indeed favors the pricing of recession risk. Table 3 reports annualized raw 
percentage excess returns as well as intercepts (percentage alphas, multiplied by 12) from the 
regression of monthly excess post-ranking returns of twelve-month equally-weighted portfolios 
(constructed by sorting U.S. stocks by their pre-ranking, 36-month historical    recession 
betas; on the U.S. market factor (MKT, CAPM), three traded Fama-French factors (U.S. 
market plus size [SMB] and book-to-market [HML]) and four traded factors (three factors plus 
momentum [MOM]).  
Raw returns and alphas are generally increasing across ex-ante   beta deciles. All four spread 
portfolio alphas are positive but insignificant over the full sample (1967-2009) and the two sub-
periods (1967-1988 and 1989-2009). For instance, for the full period, all three alphas of the 10–1 
spread are positive: the CAPM alpha is 1.27% per year, the Fama-French  3 factor model alpha 
is 1.93% per year, and the four-factor model alpha is 1.13% per year.(Annual alphas are 
computed as 12 times the monthly estimates.) However, none of these spread portfolio alphas 
are significant. 
Estimating the Premium: Mutivariate DM beta estimation using all ten portfolios   
Further insight on the sign and significance of the recession risk premium comes from its direct 
estimation using all ten DM recession beta decile portfolios, via the
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Table 3. Alphas of value-weighted portfolios of U.S. stocks sorted on historical MD recession betas 
This table reports annualized raw percentage excess returns as well as intercepts (percentage alphas, multiplied by 12) from the regression of 
monthly excess post-ranking returns of twelve-month value-weighted portfolios (constructed by sorting U.S. stocks by their pre-ranking, 36-month 
historical DM recession betas; on the U.S. market factor (MKT, CAPM), three traded Fama-French factors (U.S. market plus size [SMB] and 
book-to-market [HML]) and four traded factors (three factors plus momentum [MOM]), The t-statistics are in parentheses.  
  Decile Portfolio 
Pre-ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 
 
January 1967 - November 2009 (515 months) 
Raw Return 18.91 17.17 16.74 16.71 15.01 15.51 17.25 17.24 18.46 20.25 1.34 
 
(6.15) (6.42) (6.65) (6.99) (6.38) (6.59) (7.27) (6.83) (6.95) (6.47) (0.43) 
CAPM alpha 7.61 6.59 6.49 6.71 5.08 5.55 7.26 6.92 7.93 8.88 1.27 
 
(5.72) (5.90) (5.95) (6.36) (4.93) (5.56) (7.14) (6.76) (7.05) (6.48) (0.91) 
Fama-French 3 Factor alpha 5.48 4.08 3.90 4.08 2.40 3.11 4.75 4.54 5.80 7.41 1.93 
 
(5.93) (4.69) (4.38) (4.84) (3.04) (3.84) (5.90) (5.51) (6.38) (6.98) (1.37) 
Fama-French 4 Factor alpha 6.49 5.07 4.95 4.94 3.07 4.05 5.44 5.11 6.64 7.63 1.13 
 
(7.05) (5.85) (5.59) (5.86) (3.86) (5.03) (6.70) (6.13) (7.26) (7.02) (0.80) 
 
Jan 1967 - Dec 1988 (264 months) 
Raw Return 18.91 17.82 17.52 17.43 15.71 15.86 17.86 18.14 19.03 20.40 1.49 
 
(4.18) (4.35) (4.63) (4.74) (4.29) (4.41) (4.88) (4.66) (4.87) (4.46) (0.23) 
CAPM alpha 7.01 6.38 6.39 6.43 4.74 4.91 6.83 6.87 7.78 8.49  1.48  
 
(4.31) (4.38) (4.86) (4.93) (3.51) (4.15) (5.74) (5.31) (5.62) (4.82) (0.62) 
Fama-French 3 Factor alpha 4.13 3.24 3.82 3.50 1.58 2.21 4.41 4.15 5.66 6.87 2.74 
 
(3.74) (3.12) (3.77) (3.52) (1.61) (2.61) (4.80) (4.46) (5.99) (5.81) (1.69) 
Fama-French 4 Factor alpha 4.59 4.32 5.17 4.54 2.45 3.31 5.37 4.84 5.96 6.59 2.00 
 
(4.03) (4.13) (5.18) (4.55) (2.46) (3.95) (5.82) (5.09) (6.10) (5.38) (1.19) 
 
Jan 1989 - Nov 2009 (251 months) 
Raw Return 18.92 16.48 15.91 15.96 14.28 15.15 16.61 16.29 17.86 20.10 1.19 
 
(4.55) (4.83) (4.84) (5.27) (4.90) (5.05) (5.56) (5.13) (4.99) (4.72) (0.20) 
CAPM alpha 8.42 7.08 6.84 7.30 5.74 6.50 8.03 7.26 8.24 9.42 1.00 
 
(3.98) (4.30) (3.97) (4.56) (3.88) (4.18) (5.07) (4.76) (4.63) (4.46) (0.33) 
Fama-French 3 Factor alpha 5.48 4.08 3.90 4.08 2.40 3.11 4.75 4.54 5.80 7.41 1.93 
 
(5.93) (4.69) (4.38) (4.84) (3.04) (3.84) (5.90) (5.51) (6.38) (6.98) (1.37) 
Fama-French 4 Factor alpha 8.69 6.59 5.81 6.35 4.63 5.75 6.80 6.25 7.74 8.88 0.19 
  (6.10) (5.05) (4.27) (5.10) (4.19) (4.60) (5.75) (4.99) (5.24) (5.03) (0.08) 
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multivariate GMM procedure we have just described. Table 4 below reports estimates of     
and   
   for equally-weighted (Panel A) portfolios after accounting for priced sensitivities to the 
Fama-French three factor (  
  [           ]) model and a four factor 
(  
  [               ]) model3.  
Estimated of the recession risk premiums     in Panel A of Table 4 are always positive and 
economically and statistically significant. The full-period estimate of     is significantly positive 
for the equally weighted portfolios under both specifications (three traded factors or four). The 
sub-period estimates are all positive, and all of them are statistically significant. For example, 
annualized    recession risk premiums per average    recession beta,        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, are no less 
than                  over the full sample (1967-2009) and as high as                  over 
the later sub-period (1989-2009). 
The table also reports the GMM estimates of        
     
   , the difference between expected 
returns on the extreme decile portfolios implied by their recession betas. In the overall period, 
the annualized estimate of is                with three traded factors and                
with four traded factors. For the later sub-period, remarkably enough, the annualized estimate 
of        
     
    reaches a value as high as               with three traded factors and 
               with four traded factors.  
 In summary, we found evidence in Tables 1 and Table 4 that provides additional support to 
the notion that within U.S. stocks, recession are undesirable and DM betas
                                                          
3
 Notably, according to Panel A of Table # the over-identifying restriction given by equation    
   [          ] is never rejected by the asymptotic chi-square J -tests at 5% significance levels. 
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Table 4. DM Recession risk premiums and its contribution to Expected Returns: U.S. stocks 
This table reports estimates of annualized percentage of the risk premium (   , multiplied by 12) associated with the DM recession factor for 
multivariate DM betas (  
   ) of equally-weighted (Panel A) portfolios constructed by sorting U.S. stocks by their pre-ranking, 36-month historical 
DM betas (from the lowest [decile 1] to the highest [decile 10]). Specifically, the table reports GMM estimates of     when accounting for the 
sensitivity of these portfolios’ excess returns to the three traded Fama-French factors (U.S. market [MKT], size [SMB], and book-to-market 
[HML]), four traded factors (Fama-French factors plus momentum [MOM]), over the full sample 1967-2009 and two sub-periods (1967-1988, 1989-
2009). We also report estimates of risk premiums per average    beta (       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) and for the 10-1 spread portfolio (going long decile 10 stocks and 
short decile 1 stocks,        
     
   ). Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.  -test is the asymptotic chi-square statistic for the over-
identifying restriction in Eq. (8); the corresponding p-values are below.  
                    
  
1967 - 2009 
 
1967 - 1988 
 
1989 - 2009 
  
FF 3 Factor FF 4 Factor 
 
FF 3 Factor FF 4 Factor 
 
FF 3 Factor FF 4 Factor 
  
Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolios 
     
50.41 46.27 
 
14.51 17.23 
 
29.01 28.39 
  
(1.65) (2.01) 
 
(4.84) (4.83) 
 
(1.69) (2.07) 
          
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
4.23 5.22 
 
3.56 4.54 
 
4.80 5.95 
  
(7.03) (7.94) 
 
(7.67) (10.67) 
 
(5.43) (6.25) 
          
       
     
    
 
2.20 2.28 
 
2.93 2.79 
 
4.17 4.15 
  
(1.86) (1.79) 
 
(2.66) (2.23) 
 
(2.57) (2.57) 
          
       
 
22.51 24.87 
 
22.46 21.77 
 
19.31 17.23 
  
(0.26) (0.17) 
 
(0.26) (0.30) 
 
(0.44) (0.57) 
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may be priced such that greater exposure to recession risk is accompanied by higher expected 
returns. 
Financial Recession Factor Portfolio: 10-1 portfolio 
Given the evidence we found on the estimation of the recession risk premium via the GMM 
procedure, we argue that the 10-1 portfolio (being 10 a portfolios of stocks that have a high 
exposure to recession risk and being 1 a portfolio of stock with low exposure to recession risk) 
can be used as a traded factor to priced other portfolios. 
The traded factor is the value-weighted return on the 10-1 portfolio from a sort on historical 
recession betas. We argue that this procedure is simpler than sorting on historical betas and it is 
similarly successful at creating a spread in post-ranking betas. In this final section, we showed 
that this traded factor that we called      for convenience has an increasing positive and 
significant beta through different asset pricing model, consistent with recession risk being priced. 
 In Table 5,  we report the post ranking      betas from the regression of monthly 
excess post-ranking returns of twelve-month value-weighted portfolios (constructed by sorting 
U.S. stocks by their pre-ranking, 36-month historical DM recession betas); on the U.S. market 
factor (MKT, CAPM) plus the recession traded factor (    ), three traded Fama-French 
factors (U.S. market plus size [SMB] and book-to-market [HML]) plus the recession traded 
factor (    ),  and four traded factors (three factors plus momentum [MOM]) plus the 
recession traded factor (    ). 
CAPM, FF3, FF4 post-ranking RECF beta are increasing and statistically significant across all 
ten DM beta decile portfolio consistent with recession risk being priced. 
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Table 5. Post-Ranking Recession Betas of value-weighted portfolios of U.S. stocks sorted on historical MD recession betas 
This table reports the post ranking      betas from the regression of monthly excess post-ranking returns of twelve-month value-weighted 
portfolios (constructed by sorting U.S. stocks by their pre-ranking, 36-month historical DM recession betas); on the U.S. market factor (MKT, 
CAPM) plus the recession traded factor (    ), three traded Fama-French factors (U.S. market plus size [SMB] and book-to-market [HML]) plus 
the recession traded factor (    ),  and four traded factors (three factors plus momentum [MOM]) plus the recession traded factor (    ),  The 
t-statistics are in parentheses.  
  Decile Portfolio  
Pre-ranking DM beta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1967-2009 
CAPM Post-ranking RECF beta -0.427 -0.041 -0.006 -0.035 -0.004 0.069 0.077 0.142 0.230 0.573 
 
(-18.52) (-1.47) (-0.23) (-1.29) (-0.14) (2.64) (2.98) (5.49) (8.35) (24.88) 
FF 3 Post-ranking RECF beta -0.43 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.23 0.57 
 
(-18.52) (-1.47) (-0.23) (-1.29) (-0.14) (2.64) (2.98) (5.49) (8.35) (24.88) 
FF 4 Post-ranking RECF beta -0.41 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.25 0.59 
 
(-18.19) (-0.87) (0.44) (-0.74) (0.34) (3.43) (3.55) (6.03) (9.24) (25.71) 
 
1967-1988 
CAPM Post-ranking RECF beta -0.42 -0.12 -0.15 -0.11 -0.09 -0.02 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.58 
 
(-7.39) (-2.11) (-2.99) (-2.17) (-1.82) (-0.39) (1.48) (1.75) (3.35) (10.40) 
FF 3 Post-ranking RECF beta -0.47 -0.11 -0.15 -0.08 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.53 
 
(-15.36) (-2.84) (-3.95) (-2.23) (-1.88) (0.03) (2.45) (2.88) (4.29) (17.53) 
FF 4 Post-ranking RECF beta -0.47 -0.09 -0.13 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.53 
 
(-15.19) (-2.49) (-3.57) (-1.86) (-1.56) (0.58) (3.00) (3.25) (4.46) (17.46) 
 
1989-2009 
CAPM Post-ranking RECF beta -0.50 -0.08 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.50 
 
(-9.57) (-1.59) (0.03) (-1.52) (-0.71) (1.08) (0.17) (2.36) (3.81) (9.59) 
FF 3 Post-ranking RECF beta -0.42 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.25 0.58 
 
(-12.31) (-0.50) (1.15) (-0.75) (0.46) (2.32) (1.65) (4.16) (6.20) (17.31) 
FF 4 Post-ranking RECF beta -0.39 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.17 0.29 0.61 
  (-11.87) (0.19) (1.93) (-0.06) (1.12) (3.27) (2.38) (4.91) (7.45) (18.79) 
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Conclusions 
The CC habit model captures the fundamental idea that consumers become more risk averse as 
consumption drops during recessions. In this sense, variation across assets in expected returns is 
driven mainly by variation across assets in covariances with recessions far more than by 
variation across assets in covariances with consumption growth (Campbell and Cochrane, 
(1999)).  Surprisingly, few articles have tried to estimate and test the Campbell-Cochrane habit 
utility function on a cross section of stock returns, like for example in the Fama–French 25 size 
and book-to-market portfolios (Cochrane, 2008).  
In this article, we construct an economic and financial “recession factor” using the CC habit 
formation approach and test the significance of this factor in the cross-section of asset returns, 
based on factor innovations and portfolios based on factor covariances. We find evidence that 
the covariance between asset returns and the recession factor drives expected returns.  
In other words, fear for recession, measure by innovations to our economic measure    of 
recession risk appears to be a state variable that is important for pricing common stocks. We 
find that expected stock returns are related cross-sectionally to the sensitivities of stock returns 
to innovations in the economic recession factor. Stocks that are more sensitive economic 
downturn have substantially higher expected returns, even after we account for exposures to the 
market return as well as size, value, and momentum factors. 
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Chapter 2: 
Trading Strategies in Futures Markets 
Introduction 
 Until recently, futures markets were a relatively unknown asset class by both the 
individual and institutional investor, despite being available for trade in the United 
States for more than 100 years and even longer in other parts of the world4. The reason 
for this may be that futures market contracts are remarkably different from stocks, in 
the sense that they are short-maturity derivative claims on real assets, not claims on 
long-lived corporations; and possibly because of the lack of easily futures markets return 
data (Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006). 
 However, in recent times, individual and institutional investors are turning to 
futures markets to trade. Moreover, recent academic research has claimed “equity-like” 
returns to portfolios of commodity futures while also touting the diversification benefits 
relative to traditional asset classes5 (Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006; Erb and Harvey, 
2006). Markets participants also find in futures a first-rate instrument to hedge against 
inflation. Futures also offer leverage and are not subject to short-selling restrictions 
prevalent in the equity markets. Moreover, the nearby contracts are usually very liquid 
and transaction costs are low compared to the stocks markets trade. These make futures 
good candidates for tactical and strategic asset allocation (Wang and Yu, 2004; Erb and 
Harvey, 2006) with new implications for futures market efficiency and for futures 
market participants’ trading strategies. 
                                                          
4
 For example, Japanese rice futures, which originated the modern futures markets, were traded in Osaka 
starting in the early 18th century (see Anderson, Hamori, and Hamori 2001). 
5
 However, recent research by Daskalaki and Skiadopoulos (2010) shows that this widely-touted 
diversification role of commodities does not necessarily hold up out-of-sample. 
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 This study investigates whether the profitable momentum portfolio strategy (of 
buying past winners and selling past losers) and the long-term contrarian portfolio 
strategy (of buying past losers and selling past winners) identified in equity markets by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and De Bondt and Thaler (1985) are present in a 
cross-section of broad futures markets. Our article builds on the research of Wang and 
Yu, (2004) and Erb and Harvey (2006). The authors find strong evidence of futures 
return reversals over the 1-week horizon. Specifically, they find that a contrarian 
strategy of buying past losers and selling past winners gives rise to an average return of 
0.31% per week (16.12% per annum). Erb and Harvey’s article find evidence that a 
momentum strategy of buying past winners and selling past losers with a 12-month 
ranking period and a 1-month holding period is profitable in futures markets achieving 
an attractive excess return of 10.8% per year.  
 In particular, this paper looks at the performance of 16 momentum strategies in 
futures markets for four ranking periods (4, 6, 9 and 12 months) and four holding 
periods  (1, 2, 3, and 4 months). We find that the winner portfolios typically outperform 
the loser portfolios over holding periods that range from 1 to 4 months and this pattern 
holds for each of our formation periods. Across the 16 strategies that are profitable, one 
could make a profit of an average return of 33.63% a year by consistently buying the 
best performing futures and selling the worst performing ones. We also find evidence of 
a contrarian strategy in which past winners turn into losers over ranking and holding 
periods that range from 1 to 5 years. The average returns of the past winner portfolios 
range from -3.92% to -0.94% a year while the average returns of the past loser portfolios 
range from 6.78% to 16.07%.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
set and shows summary descriptive statistics. Section 3 summarizes the methodology 
used to construct momentum and contrarian portfolios. Section 4 discusses the results 
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from the momentum strategies. Section 5 highlights the results of the contrarian 
strategies. Finally, section 6 highlights the most important finding in our article and 
delineates further guidelines for future research. 
2 Data Description 
 In this article, we analyze monthly settlement prices for 43 US futures market 
contracts over the period January 1970-June 2008. These data were obtained from 
Price-Data Corporation. To avoid survivorship bias, we include contracts that started 
trading after January 1970 or were delisted before June 2008. In consequence, the total 
sample size ranges from a low of 12 contracts over the period April 1970-November 1973 
to a peak of 43 contracts over the period January 1999-September 2003.  
 The composition of our sample is as follows: we consider eight currencies futures 
(Australian Dollar, British Pound, Brazilian Real, Canadian Dollar, Dollar Index, Euro 
Currency, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc), three energies futures (Crude Oil, Heating Oil, 
and Natural Gas), eight financials futures (Eurodollars, EuroYen, Fed. Funds, Five 
Year Notes, Muni Bonds, Treasury Bills, Ten Year Notes, Thirty Year Bonds), five 
foods futures (Cocoa, Orange Juice, Coffee, Rough Rice, Sugar), eight grains futures 
(Soybean Oil, Corn, Kansas City Wheat, Minnesota Wheat, Oats, Soybeans, Soybean 
Meal, Wheat), seven metal/fiber futures (Cotton #2, Gold, High Grade Copper, 
Lumber, Palladium, Platinum, Silver), and lastly, four meat futures (Feeder Cattle, Live 
Cattle, Lean Hogs, Pork Bellies). One word of caution about our sample is worth 
mentioning. We do not include contracts that are traded in international markets such 
as London futures, Sydney futures, Tokyo futures and Winnipeg futures markets.  It is 
noted that excluding these contracts might introduces a sample selection bias.   
 Following the tradition in the futures markets’ literature, we compute monthly 
futures returns as the change in the logarithms of the settlement prices. Continuous 
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series of futures returns are created for each futures contract, for both the first and the 
second nearest-to-maturity contracts. Because individual futures contracts have a finite 
life defined by the contractual delivery date, an investor must sell a maturing contract 
and buy a yet-to-mature contract. This process is referred to as "rolling" a futures 
position. Therefore, these return series are created by using a rollover strategy. The 
procedure is as follows. First, we collect the futures prices on all nearest and second 
nearest contracts. We hold the first nearby contract up to one month before maturity. 
At the end of that month, we roll our position over to the second nearest contract and 
hold that contract up to one month prior to maturity. The procedure is then rolled 
forward to the next set of nearest and second nearest contracts when a new sequence of 
futures returns is computed6.  
 The article also tests the sensitivity of the results to the day of the month 
employed to compute futures returns. Therefore, we not only calculated monthly returns 
by picking the settlement price of the first trading day for each month as in Fama and 
French (1987) but we also calculate returns based on the price of the last trading day of 
the month as in Erb and Campbell (2006). Moreover, to ensure that the results are not 
driven by weekend effect we calculate returns based on the second Wednesday prices of 
each month (See Table 1). This exercise indicates that the day of the month chosen to 
calculate the returns do not alter our results. To see why this is the case, notice that the 
summary statistics presented in Table 1 are all similar to the one presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 1 Sensitivity Analysis for Futures Returns Construction 
                                                          
6
 Ma, Mercer, and Walker (1992) show that the choice of the rollover date can have unpredictable effects 
on the results of empirical studies. They compare different methods to rollover futures and demonstrate that 
important biases are generated from its selection. However, recent research by Carchano and Pardo (2009) 
indicate that the choice of the criterion to link the maturities does not matter for the construction of continuous 
series of returns. 
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Returns are calculated from monthly data for the period January 1970 to June 2008. Mean 
returns and standard deviations are annualized and are in percentages.  Monthly returns are 
calculated by picking the settlement price of the second Wednesday of the month, the first 
trading day and last trading day of each month. 
 
Average 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
2nd Wed 
First Trading 
Day 
Last Trading 
Day 
 
2nd Wed 
First Trading 
Day 
Last Trading 
Day 
Foods        
Cocoa 3.42 3.17 3.37  30.00 30.58 30.26 
Orange Juice 2.34 2.36 2.01  31.32 31.04 31.22 
Coffee 2.15 1.98 2.14  35.78 37.83 37.61 
Rough Rice 7.17 7.25 7.02  31.50 30.19 30.49 
Sugar 3.22 3.24 2.94  43.11 41.84 40.73 
Grains     0.00 0.00 0.00 
Soybean Oil 5.09 5.14 4.97  31.99 32.09 32.66 
Corn 4.24 4.33 4.27  24.81 25.87 24.77 
Kansas City 
Wheat 
2.49 2.48 2.59  23.35 21.49 21.79 
Minnesota 
Wheat 
2.18 2.17 2.19  24.15 22.38 22.87 
Oats 5.05 4.72 4.91  28.76 31.86 31.63 
Soybeans 4.50 4.55 4.47  26.45 29.43 28.19 
Soybean Meal 4.04 3.89 3.95  28.18 29.63 33.87 
Wheat 4.42 4.47 4.44  27.34 26.18 26.53 
Metals/Fiber     0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cotton 2.72 2.46 2.57  30.17 28.52 28.74 
Gold 4.82 4.80 4.80  20.65 19.16 19.13 
High Grade 
Copper 
4.47 4.28 4.39  25.62 26.46 26.12 
Lumber 1.60 1.82 1.88  29.05 29.50 29.57 
Palladium 7.00 7.06 6.59  34.91 36.03 35.90 
Platinum 6.72 6.68 6.65  26.70 28.48 27.17 
Silver 5.73 5.80 5.66  33.86 32.08 31.90 
Meats     0.00 0.00 0.00 
Feeder Cattle 1.99 1.93 2.21  18.44 18.12 18.09 
Live Cattle 2.99 3.25 3.16  21.29 20.26 20.22 
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Lean Hogs 2.76 2.64 2.76  31.52 32.83 32.02 
Pork Bellies 1.45 1.37 1.32  44.26 41.02 42.10 
Energies        
Crude Oil 5.70 5.98 6.00  32.12 32.12 32.53 
Heating Oil 6.36 6.36 5.80  30.90 33.06 33.04 
Natural Gas 10.54 11.53 11.19  54.62 56.16 57.96 
Financials     0.00 0.00 0.00 
Eurodollars 0.57 0.54 0.48  1.95 1.98 1.94 
EuroYen 0.32 0.31 0.32  0.69 0.68 119.83 
Fed. Funds 0.34 0.35 0.33  1.00 0.93 0.96 
Five Year Notes 0.67 0.66 0.64  4.75 4.92 4.82 
Muni Bonds 0.99 1.00 1.04  10.76 10.05 10.04 
Treasury Bills 0.15 0.16 0.15  2.88 2.44 2.45 
Ten Year Notes 1.77 1.74 1.56  7.49 7.41 7.24 
Thirty Year 
Bonds 
1.03 1.02 0.97  14.78 14.28 14.07 
Currencies        
Australian 
Dollar 
1.68 1.85 1.79  9.64 10.10 9.95 
British Pound -0.57 -0.49 -0.45  10.51 10.40 10.48 
Brazilian Real -4.25 -4.11 -4.00  45.51 46.53 48.95 
Canadian Dollar 0.07 0.07 0.11  5.32 5.77 5.75 
Dollar Index -2.37 -2.49 -2.37  8.73 8.87 8.60 
Euro Currency 3.02 2.90 3.38  9.62 9.54 8.96 
Japanese Yen 3.29 3.30 3.22  11.75 12.22 11.87 
Swiss Franc 2.44 2.60 2.47  12.09 12.53 12.40 
  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for monthly futures returns over the sample 
period for the nearest-to-maturity series for all contracts. Table 2 shows a positive 
unconditional mean return for all except the British Pound, Brazilian Real and Dollar 
Index futures markets. The return is insignificant. This suggests that a simple buy-and-
hold strategy is not likely to be profitable in most futures markets. Without exception, 
the t-values reported in column 3 of Table 2, show that for most futures contracts, the 
average futures return is not significantly different from zero. Bessembinder (1992), and 
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Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) use a sample period that only partially overlaps with 
our sample period and report similar statistics for these categories of futures contracts. 
However, they find that mean returns on agricultural and mineral futures are 
comparable in (absolute) size with the mean returns on financial and currency futures. 
We find similar results in our sample. For instance, mean returns on foods, grains, 
metals/fiber, meat and energies futures are larger than the mean returns on financial 
and currency futures.  As expected, standard deviations for foods, grains, metals/fiber, 
meat and energies futures returns are also somewhat larger than for financial futures. 
Table 2 Summary Statistics for Futures Returns  
Returns are calculated from monthly data for the period January 1970 to June 2008.  Mean 
returns and standard deviations are annualized and are in percentages 
Contract Name Mean Std. Dev. t-value 
Currencies 
   Australian Dollar 1.68 39.03 0.69 
British Pound -0.57 43.16 -0.26 
Brazilian Real -4.25 339.87 -0.15 
Canadian Dollar 0.07 20.07 0.07 
Dollar Index -2.37 34.79 -1.12 
Euro Currency 3.02 38.90 0.82 
Japanese Yen 3.29 49.24 1.30 
Swiss Franc 2.44 50.96 0.96 
Financials 
   Eurodollars 0.57 6.95 1.45 
EuroYen 0.32 2.42 1.89 
Fed. Funds 0.34 3.50 1.48 
Five Year Notes 0.67 17.74 0.58 
Muni Bonds 0.99 44.35 0.35 
Treasury Bills 0.15 10.46 0.27 
Ten Year Notes 1.77 29.28 1.02 
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Thirty Year Bonds 1.03 65.12 0.30 
Energies 
   Crude Oil 5.70 189.83 0.52 
Heating Oil 6.36 178.82 0.67 
Natural Gas 10.54 479.49 0.32 
Foods 
   Cocoa 3.42 170.89 0.41 
Orange Juice 2.34 182.55 0.28 
Coffee 2.15 225.31 0.19 
Rough Rice 7.17 184.13 0.63 
Sugar 3.22 308.52 0.22 
Grains 
   Soybean Oil 5.09 188.63 0.58 
Corn 4.24 129.34 0.70 
Kansas City Wheat 2.49 118.72 0.41 
Minnesota Wheat 2.18 124.49 0.32 
Oats 5.05 160.42 0.68 
Soybeans 4.50 141.82 0.68 
Soybean Meal 4.04 155.62 0.56 
Wheat 4.42 148.80 0.64 
Metals/Fiber 
   Cotton 2.72 172.42 0.34 
Gold 4.82 100.36 0.96 
High Grade Copper 4.47 135.45 0.71 
Lumber 1.60 162.86 0.20 
Palladium 7.00 216.53 0.63 
Platinum 6.72 143.77 1.00 
Silver 5.73 206.18 0.60 
Meats 
   Feeder Cattle 1.99 86.32 0.47 
Live Cattle 2.99 104.57 0.61 
Lean Hogs 2.76 184.31 0.32 
Pork Bellies 1.45 323.28 0.10 
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3 Methodology 
 This paper evaluates 32 trading strategies. In particular, we focus on 16 short-
term momentum strategies with four ranking periods (4, 6, 9, and 12 months) and four 
holding periods (1, 2, 3, and 4 months) and in 16 long-term contrarian strategies with 
four ranking periods (12, 24, 36 and 60 months) and four holding periods7 (12, 24, 36 
and 60 months). 
 Futures contracts are sorted at the end of each month into deciles based on their 
average return over the previous J months (ranking period). The decision to form 
deciles was based our desire to enhance the dispersion of returns between the best and 
worst performing futures and thus the profitability of the strategies. By adopting this 
approach, our cross section return gets smaller as the risk diversification decreases. 
Wang and Yu (2004) find evidence suggesting that trading activity enhances short-term 
contrarian profits in futures markets. Therefore, the futures contracts in each of the 
deciles are value weighted by adopting a weighting scheme that assigns higher weights 
to the contracts with higher open interests.  
 The performance of both the top and bottom deciles is monitored over the 
subsequent K months holding period over which no rebalancing is made. We call the 
resulting strategy the J-K momentum or contrarian strategy. Following the traditional 
momentum literature (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999 and Jegadeesh and Titman, 
2001), we form overlapping winner and loser portfolios. Taking, as an example, the 6-3 
momentum strategy, the winner portfolio in, say, November is formed by equally 
weighting the top 3 deciles portfolios that were formed at the end of August, September 
and October. The same mechanics applies to the loser portfolio. Its return is equal to 
                                                          
7
 The choice of the formation and holding periods is arbitrary. Wang and Yu (2004) study focused on the 
1-week horizon for the contrarian strategy. Badrinath et al. (1995) and Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) suggest 
that it may take longer for some asset prices to revert after under/outperforming; therefore, we consider the 
formation period up to 12 months and the holding period up to 4 months. This seems appropriate given that 
futures trading usually concentrates on contracts that typically mature within two or three months. 
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the average return in November of the 3 bottom deciles that were formed at the end of 
August, September and October. The return of the momentum (contrarian) strategy is 
then simply defined as the difference in the November returns of the winner (loser) and 
loser (winner) portfolios. The procedure is rolled over to the next month, where another 
set of winners, losers, momentum and contrarian portfolios is formed. Since the October 
winner and loser contribute towards only a third of the November momentum profits, it 
is realistic to assume that the momentum profits are not driven by bid-ask bounce. 
Therefore, following Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), we chose not to skip a month 
between the ranking and holding periods.  
4 Momentum Strategies 
 In this section we examine whether future returns are predictable based on past 
returns over short horizons in futures markets by showing the results of our momentum 
strategies. We test 16 short-term momentum trading strategies with four ranking 
periods (4, 6, 9 and 12 months) and four holding periods  (1, 2, 3, and 4 months). Table 
3 presents summary statistics of returns for these short-term momentum strategies 
where the rows represent the ranking periods in which the portfolios cumulative returns 
were calculated and the columns the holding periods. For example, the first row and 
column present the average return for a portfolio of a relative strength strategy based 
on 12 month lagged returns and one month holding period.  
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Table 3 Summary Statistics of Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios 
The mean and standard deviation are annualized. The reward-to-risk ratio is measured as the ratio of the annualized mean to the annualized standard 
deviation. The p-values for the significance of the mean are in parentheses. Our definition of returns assumes that we hold contracts up to one month 
before maturity, at which date the position is rolled over to the second nearest contract and held up to one month prior to maturity. Futures prices are 
collected at a monthly frequency, in particular for the second Wednesday of each month to avoid the weekend effect. 
 
1-Month Holding Period 
 
2-Month Holding Period 
 
3-Month Holding Period 
 
4-Month Holding Period  
Portfolios 
based on 
Sell 
Losers 
Buy 
Winners 
Buy-
Sell 
 
Sell 
Losers 
Buy 
Winners 
Buy-
Sell 
 
Sell 
Losers 
Buy 
Winners 
Buy-
Sell 
 
Sell 
Losers 
Buy 
Winners 
Buy-
Sell 
12 months 
lagged returns                               
Mean -13.10 29.88 49.03 
 
-7.32 20.63 29.70 
 
-4.00 16.95 21.55 
 
-0.03 12.88 12.77 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.38) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.99) (0.04) (0.09) 
Std 30.42 52.79 60.63 
 
29.77 42.36 50.90 
 
29.06 38.36 47.26 
 
28.33 36.09 44.43 
Sharpe Ratio -0.431 0.566 0.809 
 
-0.246 0.487 0.583 
 
-0.138 0.442 0.456 
 
-0.001 0.357 0.287 
9 months 
lagged returns 
               Mean -13.76 28.44 47.67 
 
-4.36 17.55 22.44 
 
-1.46 15.41 16.12 
 
0.13 13.27 12.12 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.74) (0.01) (0.03) 
 
(0.98) (0.02) (0.08) 
Std 28.76 44.72 52.09 
 
27.75 40.71 47.27 
 
27.61 36.38 43.06 
 
27.30 34.13 41.23 
Sharpe Ratio -0.4784 0.6359 0.9151 
 
-0.1570 0.4312 0.4748 
 
-0.0529 0.4236 0.3743 
 
0.0047 0.3890 0.2941 
6 months 
lagged returns 
               Mean -21.72 30.37 65.34 
 
-11.88 18.73 34.33 
 
-6.18 13.33 20.06 
 
-2.50 10.10 11.81 
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p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.14) (0.04) (0.01) 
 
(0.54) (0.08) (0.07) 
Std 29.81 57.14 62.58 
 
28.23 43.39 48.46 
 
26.95 38.19 43.58 
 
26.04 34.54 39.22 
Sharpe Ratio -0.7287 0.5316 1.0440 
 
-0.4210 0.4316 0.7084 
 
-0.2292 0.3490 0.4604 
 
-0.0959 0.2924 0.3011 
4 months 
lagged returns 
               Mean -28.71 41.11 96.08 
 
-16.77 25.72 49.92 
 
-10.27 16.72 28.72 
 
-5.66 14.91 20.52 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) 
 
(0.15) (0.01) (0.00) 
Std 30.53 64.69 68.82 
 
27.27 52.79 56.51 
 
26.49 44.62 47.61 
 
25.60 33.96 37.30 
Sharpe Ratio -0.9403 0.6354 1.3960   -0.6149 0.4872 0.8834   -0.3877 0.3746 0.6032   -0.2211 0.4392 0.5499 
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 It is clear from Table 3 that the winner portfolios typically outperform the loser 
portfolios over holding periods that range from 1 to 4 months. Note that this pattern 
holds for each of our formation periods. Note that for 12 out of 16 strategies the 
difference in returns between the winner and the loser portfolios is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The other four strategies give us a positive average return 
and are still significant at the 5% level. Across the 16 strategies that are profitable, one 
could earn an average return of 33.63% a year by consistently buying the best 
performing futures contracts and selling the worst performing ones. The results in Table 
3 are consistent with Erb and Harvey (2006) who observe that a 12-1 momentum 
strategy is profitable in futures markets. Our results are also in line with the well-known 
results of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) who show that stocks that perform the 
best (worst) over a 3 to 12 months period tend to continue to perform well (poorly) over 
the subsequent 3 to 12 months.  
 We observe that in 10 out of the 16 strategies that are profitable, the loser 
portfolios always earn negative and significant average return that range from a low of -
0.03% (for the 12-4 strategy) to a high of -28.71% (for the 4-1 strategy). The data from 
the 16 winner portfolios is significant both in economic and statistical terms. The winner 
portfolios offer average returns that can range from a low of 10.10% (for the 6-4 
strategy) to a high of 41.11% (for the 4-1 strategy). According to our results and within 
the frame of our 16 trading strategies we can conclude that price continuation in futures 
markets is mainly driven by the winners.  
 We also report in Table 3 the annualized standard deviations and the Sharpe’s 
reward-to-risk ratios of the strategies given the possibility that the momentum 
strategies might pay off as a compensation for risk.  As we would expect, the most 
profitable strategies rank among the most risky. To see why this is the case, notice that 
the 4-1 momentum strategy with an average returns of 96.08% offers the highest 
 49 
 
average returns and, with a standard deviation of 68.82%, it is also the most volatile. 
On the other hand, any trading strategy that combines any of the proposed rankings 
periods (12, 9, 6, or 4) with 4-month holdings period momentum strategy falls among 
the lowest level of risk strategies (between 37.30% and 44.43%), subsequently, it gives 
the lowest average return (between 11.81% and 20.52%).  
 However, two unexpected result are worth mentioning. The 6-1 and 4-1 profitable 
momentum strategies in Table 3 had reward-to-risk ratios greater than one, which 
indicates that the return is greater than or proportional to the risk the investor incurred 
to earn that return. A negative Sharpe ratio would indicate that a risk-less asset would 
perform better than the security being analyzed. Over the same period, a long-only 
portfolio that equally weights the 43 futures contracts we considered in this study 
earned 5.09% a year with a Sharpe ratio of 0.001. We also note that over the same 
period, the S&P500 composite index had earned a 1.18% a year with a Sharpe ratio of 
0.1325. Overall, this indicates that momentum strategies perform better on a risk-
adjusted basis than passive long-only strategies in equity and futures markets. 
5 Contrarian Strategies 
 This section presents the summary statistics of returns of long-term contrarian 
strategies in futures markets. In particular, it analyzes 16 long-term contrarian 
strategies with four ranking periods (12, 24, 36 and 60 months) and four holding periods 
(12, 24, 36 and 60 months). Table 4 reports summary statistics of returns of long-term 
contrarian strategies. A contrarian strategy states that the losers (winners) in the 
ranking period will turn into winners (losers) in the holding period. Similarly, the 
winners in the ranking period will turn into losers in the holding period. Consequently 
and consistent with DeBondt and Thaler (1985),  a contrarian strategy that deliberately 
buys the long-term underpriced losers and sells the long-term overpriced winners turn 
out to be lucrative  
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 The results in Table 4 indicate that the systematic rebalancing of futures 
contracts portfolios using a contrarian approach is a source of abnormal returns in 
futures markets. There is evidence that past winners turn into losers over ranking and 
holding periods that range from 1 to 5 years. The average returns of the past winner 
portfolios range from -3.92% to -0.94% a year while the average returns of the past loser 
portfolios range from 6.78% to 16.07%. As a result, all of the contrarian strategies are 
lucrative.  
 The findings have other notable aspects. First, the contrarian pattern identified 
in stock markets over long-term horizons by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) is present in 
futures markets and they are consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Second, the 
overreaction effect is asymmetric; it is much larger for losers than for winners. Finally, 
the overreaction phenomenon mostly occurs during the second year of the test period, if 
we exclude the (J, 1) contrarian strategies.  
 It would be interesting to investigate in future research whether the profits 
remain significant after corrections for plausible transaction costs in futures trading, and 
whether imperfections in market microstructure like bid-ask spread and nonsynchronous 
trading have a non-trivial effects in our futures markets’ sample. Granted that 
transaction costs in futures markets range from 0.0004% to 0.033% (Locke and 
Venkatesh, 1997), which is much less than the conservative 0.5% estimate of Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) for the equity market, we do not expect that including transaction 
costs would affect our results in a significant way. 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics for Returns of Contrarian Portfolios 
The mean and standard deviation are annualized. The reward-to-risk ratio is measured as the ratio of the annualized mean to the 
annualized standard deviation. The p-values for the significance of the mean are in parentheses. Our definition of returns assumes 
that we hold contracts up to one month before maturity, at which date the position is rolled over to the second nearest contract and 
held up to one month prior to maturity.  Futures prices are collected at a monthly frequency, in particular for the second Wednesday 
of each month to avoid the weekend effect.   
 
1-Year Holding Period    2-Year Holding Period  
 
3-Year Holding Period  
 
5-Year Holding Period  
Portfolios 
based on 
Sell 
Winner
s 
Buy 
Losers 
Buy-
Sell 
 
Sell 
Winner
s 
Buy 
Losers 
Buy-
Sell 
 
Sell 
Winners 
Buy 
Losers 
Buy-
Sell 
 
Sell 
Winners 
Buy 
Losers 
Buy-
Sell 
5 years 
lagged 
returns                               
Mean -3.17 16.07 20.80 
 
-0.98 12.50 14.66 
 
-1.01 9.45 11.88 
 
1.76 6.78 6.00 
p-value (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.80) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.78) (0.04) (0.02) 
 
(0.61) (0.12) (0.20) 
Std 24.93 28.35 33.69 
 
22.92 27.67 31.13 
 
21.43 26.46 28.80 
 
20.63 25.29 26.78 
Sharpe 
Ratio -0.127 0.567 0.618 
 
-0.043 0.452 0.471 
 
-0.047 0.357 0.412 
 
0.085 0.268 0.224 
3 years 
lagged 
returns 
               Mean -0.94 13.57 15.67 
 
0.77 13.13 13.40 
 
1.87 10.44 9.69 
 
3.70 7.11 4.16 
p-value (0.82) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.84) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.60) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
(0.29) (0.07) (0.23) 
Std 24.65 27.33 30.84 
 
22.89 25.73 26.71 
 
21.77 26.03 25.67 
 
20.99 23.40 20.86 
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Sharpe 
Ratio -0.0381 0.4966 0.5082 
 
0.0336 0.5103 
0.501
5 
 
0.0857 0.4011 
0.377
5 
 
0.1762 0.3041 
0.199
5 
2 years 
lagged 
returns 
               Mean -3.92 12.57 17.80 
 
-1.09 14.44 16.31 
 
0.68 12.53 12.48 
 
2.58 9.90 7.52 
p-value (0.37) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.77) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.85) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.46) (0.01) (0.04) 
Std 27.54 27.81 34.32 
 
23.47 25.11 27.04 
 
22.24 24.03 23.72 
 
21.74 23.27 21.67 
Sharpe 
Ratio -0.1423 0.4520 0.5186 
 
-0.0465 0.5752 
0.603
4 
 
0.0304 0.5213 
0.526
3 
 
0.1184 0.4254 
0.346
9 
1 years 
lagged 
returns 
               Mean 5.83 6.13 1.46 
 
3.07 8.91 7.56 
 
4.72 9.18 5.62 
 
4.63 8.36 4.79 
p-value (0.20) (0.15) (0.78) 
 
(0.43) (0.02) (0.06) 
 
(0.19) (0.01) (0.09) 
 
(0.16) (0.02) (0.09) 
Std 27.86 26.21 31.93 
 
23.90 23.71 23.75 
 
22.05 21.94 20.12 
 
20.20 21.81 17.09 
Sharpe 
Ratio 0.2092 0.2338 0.0458   0.1283 0.3760 
0.318
3   0.2142 0.4183 
0.279
5   0.2292 0.3831 
0.280
5 
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6 Conclusions  
 In this article, we examine whether futures markets returns are predictable based 
on past returns over short and long horizons. In particular, we look at the performance 
of 16 momentum strategies in a cross-section of broad futures markets for four ranking 
periods (4, 6, 9 and 12 months) and four holding periods  (1, 2, 3, and 4 months). Our 
results show that the winner portfolios typically outperform the loser portfolios over 
holding periods that range from 1 to 4 months. We document that this pattern holds for 
each of our formation periods. Across the 16 strategies that are profitable, one could 
earn an average return of 33.63% a year by consistently buying the best performing 
futures and selling the worst performing ones.  
 We also find evidence that past winners turn into losers over ranking and holding 
periods that range from 1 to 5 years. The average returns of the past winner portfolios 
range from -3.92% to -0.94% a year while the average returns of the past loser portfolios 
range from 6.78% to 16.07%. As a result, all of the contrarian strategies are profitable. 
 Overall, our article indicates that relative-strength and contrarian strategies 
perform better on a risk-adjusted basis than passive long-only strategies in equity and 
futures markets, making futures markets contracts attractive candidates to be included 
in well-diversified portfolios. Further, since arbitrage strategies are more readily 
available than in equity markets due to the low cost and high liquidity of futures 
trading, these results have significant implications for academics in terms of market 
efficiency and for practitioners in terms practical trading strategies and asset allocation. 
 A question left for further research is related to the role of institutional investors 
in futures markets. An interesting exercise could be to test whether the momentum 
profits have decreased recently due to a rising interest of institutional investors in 
futures markets.  
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 Finally, it would be interesting to study also whether the profits remain 
significant after corrections for plausible transaction costs in futures trading, and second 
whether imperfections in market microstructure like bid-ask spread and non-
synchronous trading have a non-trivial effects in our futures markets’ sample. 
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Chapter 3
Information Sharing Networks in the Banking Industry
1 Introduction
The literature has long stressed that banks face “adverse selection” or “moral hazard”
problems in its lending activity. Adverse selection arises when some information about
the borrowers’ characteristics (i.e. credit applicants’ projects riskiness) remain hidden
to the lender and can lead to an inefficient allocation of credit, for instance to its
rationing (e.g.?). Moreover, after credit is granted moral hazard arises instead from the
lender’s inability to observe borrower’s actions (i.e. lack of effort in ensuring the
project’s success or attempt to default partly on the loan by renegotiating it) that affect
the probability of repayment.
To a certain extent, these adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be
alleviated if the borrower can pledge some collateral, or if he owns a considerable equity
stake in the project or by keeping a good reputation in the business community.
Unfortunately, many credit applicants, for instance, young and small firms, typically
lack sufficient collateral and equity capital and have a short length of credit history.
Screening credit applications may help to reduce the adverse selection problem and
monitoring borrowers may help to ease the moral hazard problem. The production of
information is costly and the incentives to spend on information production may be
reduced by the free rider problem. For instance, while the outcome of the screening test
may not be observable by third parties, competitor banks can still extract information
about the screened entrepreneurs by simply observing whether the bank extends or
denies the loan.
A cheaper and more effective way to acquire information is by exchanging it with other
lenders. In practice, we observe a considerable exchange of information among lenders.
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In many countries lenders communicate data concerning their customers’
creditworthiness to one another or can access databases that help them assess credit
applicants. Most of the times, this information exchange takes place via formal
mechanisms. Some of these are voluntary, while others are imposed by regulation.
“Credit bureaus” are typical voluntary mechanisms, which operate on the principle of
reciprocity, collecting, filing and distributing the information supplied voluntarily by
their members. The incentive members have to truthfully reveal information is enforced
invariably by threatening deviants that they will be excluded from access to the common
data base. Some bureaus are profit-oriented ventures created at the initiative of
entrepreneurs; others are set up by coalitions of lenders as cooperative arrangements 1.
Public credit registers, instead, are databases created by public authorities and
managed by central banks. Their data are compulsorily reported by lenders, who then
obtain a return flow of data for use in their lending decisions.
In many developing countries, entrepreneurs complained that formal lenders request
their loans to be assisted by collateral whose value often greatly surpasses the value of
the loan. Moreover, in some cases, lenders exert no effort at all to learn the intrinsic
value of the cash flows that can be generated by the project they are financing. The
availability of more readily usable information, together with the acquaintance with
credit scoring techniques, may contribute to a shift in their lending strategy, as
highlighted by ?. The availability of better mechanism for sharing information may lead
banks to move somewhat from a collateral-based lending policy to an information-based
one improving the efficiency of financial intermediaries.
Sharing credit information finds a limit in the set of legal provisions designed to protect
individual privacy. Such provisions differ widely both within Europe and between the
1Also credit rating agencies, such as Duns & Bradstreet in the US, can be seen as a voluntary
information sharing mechanisms, insofar as they draw a large portion of their data from lenders and
suppliers, who in return obtain preferential access to their data.
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US and European countries, and these differences appear to have had profound effects
on the development of credit information systems (see ?). For instance, Frances strict
safeguards for consumer privacy are so strong that regulation has impeded the
emergence of private credit bureaus. In medium-protection countries as the United
States, data can be accessed only for an “admissible purpose”, essentially the granting
of credit. There are low-protection consumer privacy countries, such as Argentina,
where virtually anyone can is granted access to all debtors data not considering the
purpose of the investigation.
In many countries lenders communicate data concerning their customers
creditworthiness to one another or can access databases that help them assess credit
applicants. Often lenders agree to exchange of information spontaneously, via
information brokers such as credit bureaus. In other cases they are obliged to do so by
the authorities via public credit registers. However, the type, quality, and quantity of
data available, and information-sharing mechanism, vary greatly from country to
country.
This article studies in a normative way style the theoretical foundations that lenders
have to share credit information about borrowers or project’s quality. The question of
which is the best mechanism or network architecture to share information may have
important implication for the regulation of the financial system, given the important
effect that financial systems have in the economy.
We construct a model in which banks operate in different market structures following
the model by ?. In this setting information production is the main role played by
banks. In particular, I assume that banks have access to a screening technology that, at
a cost, allows them to discriminate among high and low quality investments projects
(i.e. different types of borrowers). However, given the free-riding problem associated
with information production, I set out the model in a network architecture which allows
the study of R&D alliances as a means to internalize spillovers.
Using different network structures, I model different ways by which banks may be
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connected to share information. The novelty of the article is that I model the banking
industry within a network framework that provide us with some useful insights on: (1)
how bank interconnections affect the level of effort (i.e. investment in information
technologies) that individual financial institutions devote to screen the quality of new
investment projects. (2) How the degree to which banks are connected to each other
through bilateral exposures may affect its marginal cost of producing information about
the creditworthiness of the borrowers. (3) How bank interconnections affect the level of
profit of the individual financial institutions.
The model gives an answer to what is the optimal number of credit sharing information
alliances individual banks should have to maximize expected profits, taking into
account the different market structure in which they interact. I find that if banks
operate in independent markets, then it is optimal that each bank shares credit
information with all the other banks. This is in line with the tendency of credit bureaus
- that were set up originally by small coalitions of lenders as cooperative arrangements -
to be totally integrated in one big credit agency.
Other finding is that in homogeneous loan market, where banks compete a la Cournot
(banks operate within an oligopolistic industry), banks profits are maximized at an
intermediate level of sharing credit information. This result also may add an alternative
explanation why we observe syndicated loans 2 even in countries in which formal sharing
information systems are well established. Syndicated loans allow the sharing of credit
risk between various financial institutions without the disclosure and marketing burden
that bond issuers face (in other words, they allow the partial elimination of the adverse
selection and moral hazard cost of originating the loan for the bank loans portfolio).
2A syndicated loan is a credit granted by a group of lenders, typically commercial banks, to a borrower.
Every syndicate member has a separate claim on the debtor, although there is a single loan agreement
contract. The creditors can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of senior syndicate
members and is led by one or several lenders, typically acting as mandated arrangers, arrangers, lead
managers or agents. The second group, the junior banks may vary their number and identity according
to the size, complexity and pricing of the loan as well as the willingness of the borrower to increase the
range of its banking relationships.
59
Leading banks may have several reasons for arranging a syndication. It can be a means
of avoiding excessive single-name exposure, in compliance with regulatory limits on risk
concentration, while maintaining a relationship with the borrower. For junior banks,
participating in a syndicated loan may be advantageous for several reasons. These
banks may be motivated by a lack of origination capability in certain types of
transactions, geographical areas or industrial sectors, or indeed a desire to cut down on
origination costs. While junior participating banks typically earn just a margin and no
fees, they may also hope that in return for their involvement, the client will reward
them by getting loans directly from them in the future, or with more profitable
business, such as treasury management, corporate finance or advisory work. A new
transaction with someone with whom one has a history of prior relationships or who has
ties with others to whom one is also connected poses far lower transaction and
coordination costs than might be expected within a more traditional analysis.
This research may be important to evaluate the economic effects of information sharing
systems obtaining directions for the design of credit information systems, especially in
developing countries, in which, the role of informal lending and informal information
sharing is much larger than in developed economies.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce some network
terminology and describe the model. Section 3, we use the model to see the effect of
strategic alliances on banks that operates in a oligopolistic environment. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
We consider a three-stage game. At stage one, banks form pair-wise collaboration links.
For the sake of simplicity, forming links is costless. The purpose of these connections in
the banking industry is sharing knowledge about a cost-reducing screening technology
that allows them to discriminate the quality of investment projects or the
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creditworthiness of the borrower. At stage two, the R&D (information sharing) alliances
are set up and banks choose their individual level of R&D expenditure (in order to
increase the quality of the screening process) that maximizes their expected payoffs.
The R&D efforts, along with the networks of collaboration, define the cost structure of
the banks. Finally, at stage three, banks operate in the market, taking as given the
costs of producing the information.
In this article, we focus our analysis in the networks of collaboration in two different
market competition frameworks. We first study collaborations among banks operating
in independent markets. Subsequently, we study collaborations in a
homogeneous-product oligopoly environment with quantity-setting banks. In particular,
in the third stage, we assume that the n banks compete a la Cournot.
2.1 Networks Notation and Specification of the Model
Networks
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n}, n ≥ 2 be the set of banks. The structure of alliances between the
banks can be described as a non directed graph, in which nodes represent the banks and
edges the collaboration links or alliances. A typical graph of alliances g is thus a pair
(N,L) where N is a set of banks and L is a subset of all pairs of banks. Let denote by
G the set of all non directed graphs with N banks. Let gij ∈ {0, 1} be a binary variable
that represents the pair-wise relationship between any pair of banks i,j ∈ N . The
variable gij = 1 if there exists a link between two banks i and j and 0 otherwise. A
network g is then a collection of links, i.e., g = {gij}i,j∈N . Let g − gij denote the
network obtained by deleting an existing link between banks i and j from network g,
while g + gij is the network obtained by adding a new link between banks i and j in
network g. Let Ni(g) be the set of banks with which bank i forms a link in the graph g
and ηi(g) represents the cardinality of set Ni(g) or bank i
′s degree.
Let’s define some basic network architectures that will be use in our analysis. A
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network is said to be regular if every bank has the same number of links, i.e., ηi(g) = η,
∀i ∈ N . The complete network, gc, is a regular network such that ηi(g) = η − 1, ∀i ∈ N
while the empty network, ge, is a regular network in which ηi(g) = 0. Other network
architectures are the star network, gs, in which there is one bank which is linked to the
others banks. Formally, there is a bank i such that gi,j = 1 for all j 6= i and gi,j = 0 for
every pair of banks j, k 6= i. The unconnected network, gu, is the one in which one bank
is isolated and the other banks have at least one link.
Cost Structure and Collaboration Alliances
We assume a market with n banks that are ex-ante symmetric, with zero fixed cost and
identical marginal costs c. Before competition takes place, banks can individually invest
in some marginal-cost-reducing technology with the goal of gaining more market power
on the competition stage. Moreover, banks can engage in non-exclusive collaboration
agreements to share and reduce the costs of R&D efforts. Any agreement to jointly
invest in some cost-reducing technology or activity will be interpreted in our framework
as a collaboration link.
A particular network architecture will arise after all the banks in the market have
decided how to undertake their cost-reducing investment projects, either in isolation or
in collaboration with others banks. Then, given some network g, each bank chooses
unilaterally an R&D effort level, ei ∈ E = [0, c], with the goal of lowering its own
marginal cost. Individual efforts also have positive spillover externalities on the costs of
other banks. Let ψ ∈ [0, 1) be a parameter that reflects the level of spillovers among
banks with no collaboration links. If two banks have a collaboration link, then this
spillover is perfect, and if they do not have a collaboration link, then this spillover is
imperfect.Thus, the marginal cost of production of bank i can be expressed as following,
ci(e/g) = c−
ei + ∑
j∈Ni(g)
ej + ψ
∑
m/∈Ni∪{i}
em

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For simplicity, we assume that the effort of any bank exclusively and fully spills over its
partners. Furthermore, there are no spillovers from outside the industry. In others
words, ψ = 0. Thus, the effective marginal costs of production of a bank i, given
network g and a profile of efforts levels {ei(g)}i∈N are
ci(e/g) = c−
ei + ∑
j∈Ni(g)
ej
 (1)
In this specification, marginal cost of i decreases linearly in the number of banks
belonging to the same coalition as i. Observe that the total cost reduction for some
bank i comes from its own research effort ei, and the research effort of others banks.
Moreover, we assume that R&D effort is costly. Formally, we use the following
specification Z(ei) = θ e
2
i where θ > 0 and sufficiently large to ensure bank decision
problems have interior solutions. In other words, it ensures profit function is concave in
own effort. Under this specification, the cost of R&D effort is a non-decreasing function
and exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
Payoffs
A network of collaboration g leads to a vector of R&D efforts {ej(g)}i∈N , which in turn
defines the banks’ production costs {ci(g)}i∈N . Given these marginal costs, banks
operate in the market by choosing quantities {qi(g)}i∈N . The inverse demand is
assumed to be linear and given by P = a− bQ, with a > c.
In the independent market case, Q = qi, and the profits of bank i in collaboration
network g are
Πi(g) = [a− b qi(g)− ci(g)] qi − θ e2i (g) ∀i = 1, . . . , n (2)
In the homogeneous-good market with quantity-setting banks, Q =
∑n
i=1 qi. Thus, the
profits of bank i in collaboration network g are given by,
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Πi(g) =
[
a− b qi(g)− b
∑
j 6=i
qj(g)− ci(g)
]
qi(g)− θ e2i (g) ∀i = 1, . . . , n (3)
Networks Stability
A network g is said to be stable if any bank that is linked to another in the network has
an incentive to maintain the link and any two banks that are not linked have no
incentive to form a link with each other. This definition follows the notion of stability
presented in ?. Formally, a network g is stable if and only if for all i, j ∈ N ,
(i) if gij = 1, then pii(g) ≥ pii(g − gij) and pij(g) ≥ pij(g − gij).
(ii) if gij = 0 and pii(g + gij) > pii(g), then pij(g + gij) < pij(g).
This definition of stability, which is taken from ?), is quite weak and should be seen as a
necessary condition for strategic stability for any given network.
Efficiency
For any network g, social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and
producers’ profits. If we denote aggregate welfare as W (g) for any network g, we say
that a network g is efficient if and only if W (g) > W (g′) for all g′. This concept of
efficiency is in the spirit of a second best, since efforts and quantities are chosen within
a noncooperatively framework. When banks operate in independent markets, social
welfare is describe by the following expression,
W (g) =
n∑
i=1
(
q2i (g)
2
+ pi(g)
)
(4)
Let Q(g) =
∑n
i=1 qi(g) be the aggregate output in network g for the
homogeneous-product oligopoly. In this case, it is easily seen that
W (g) =
Q(g)2
2
+
n∑
i=1
pi(g) (5)
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Symmetric Networks
A network is said to be symmetric if every bank has the same number of collaboration
links. In a symmetric network ηi(g) = ηj(g) = k for any two banks i and j. The number
k will be referred to as the degree of network g or, equivalently, as the level of
collaborative activity. We will denote a symmetric network of degree k by gk,
k = 0, 1, ..., n− 1. It is worth emphasizing that symmetric networks allow for
nonexclusive relationships. For example, a symmetric network of degree two involves a
bank having links with banks that are not linked to each other. Note that if the number
of banks is even, then there is always a set of links l such that the resulting network is
symmetric of degree k, where k = 0, 1, ..., n− 1.
2.2 Independent Markets Case
We first present the model for a general firm and in the next section we applied the
model for the banking industry. Collaborations between firms operating in independent
markets are commonly observed. In such an environment, individual R&D effort has no
implications for the level of market competitiveness of potential collaborators. This
setting therefore allows us to isolate the pure effects of collaboration. We find that
collaboration between firms increases the level of effort by individual firms. Moreover,
every pair of firms has an incentive to form links, and the complete network is the
unique stable and efficient network.
Market Outcome. Given a network g, and the R&D efforts levels {ei(g)}i∈N , firms
choose quantities to maximize their monopoly profits given by expression (2) above.
Standard derivations show that equilibrium quantities are qi(g) = [a− ci(g)]/2b for all i,
which yield the following profit function after we had plugged them back into (2).
Πi(g) =
[a− ci(g)]2
4b
− θ e2i (g)
∀i = 1, . . . , n(6)
65
R&D Efforts. In the second stage of the game, firms choose their R&D efforts to
maximize the reduced-form profits (6). The costs ci(g) depend on the effort levels
undertaken by the firms, which in turn are a function of the existing network. Therefore,
using (1) and the fact we consider only symmetric networks of degree k, we obtain
Πi(g
k) =
[
a− c+ ei +
∑
l∈Ni(g) el
]2
4b
− θ e2i (g)
∀i = 1, . . . , n(7)
We observe in the expression above that the profits of bank i are a non-decreasing and
convex function of the efforts of banks that have some collaborative agreement with
bank i. In other words, the efforts of collaborating banks are strategic complements.
From the first order condition, (a− c+ ei +
∑
l∈Ni(g) el)− 4b θ e2i = 0 and by invoking
symmetry, we obtain the following simple expression for the equilibrium R&D efforts,
e∗i (g
k) =
(a− c)
[4bθ − (k + 1)] ∀i = 1, . . . , n (8)
We can also analyse the nature of the equilibrium marginal cost reduction by
substituting (8) into the cost structure ci = c− (k + 1)e∗i given by (1) and using the fact
we consider only symmetric networks of degree k, we obtain
c∗i (g
k) = c− (k + 1) (a− c)
[4bθ − (k + 1)] ∀i = 1, . . . , n (9)
Finally, by substituting the equilibrium level of efforts obtained in (8) into (7) we can
examine the nature of equilibrium profits given by
Π∗i (g
k) =
(a− c)2 θ (4bθ − 1)
[4bθ − (k + 1)]2 ∀i = 1, . . . , n (10)
Proposition 1 Assume firms operate in independent markets. Then individual R&D
efforts and profits are increasing with respect to the level of collaborative activity while
marginal costs are decreasing.
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Proof. See Appendix.
2.3 Homogeneous-product oligopoly
In the previous section, we tried to provide an explanation why collaborations between
firms operating in independent markets were commonly observed. In such an
environment, individual R&D effort had no implications for the level of market
competitiveness of potential collaborators, isolating the pure effects of collaboration.
In this section, we follow the method of ?,and study collaborations between firms
operating in the same market. In this new setting, a firm’s R&D effort lowers the costs
of its collaborators, which in this setting makes them more competitive. This reduces
the marginal returns to investing in R&D as additional links of collaborations are
formed. The analysis illustrates how this competition effect influences the private and
social incentives to collaborate. Their first observation concerns the effects of
collaboration on the R&D effort of individual firms.
Market outcome. In the market competition stage, we note that given a cost
configuration of firms, {ci(g)}i∈N , the equilibrium quantity of bank i in a
homogeneous-product oligopoly is obtained by solving firm i′s optimization problem
given by (3).
qi(g) =
1
(n+ 1) b
[
a− n ci(g) +
∑
j 6=i
cj
]
∀i = 1, . . . , n (11)
Substituting for the equilibrium value of qi(g) in the profit function given by (3), we are
left that the profits of the Cournot competitors are given by the following expression:
Πi(e/g
k) =
[
a− n ci(e/g) +
∑
j 6=i cj(e/g)
]2
b (n+ 1)2
− θ e2i (g) ∀i = 1, . . . , n (12)
The derivations in the appendix allow us to express the payoffs in terms of research
efforts directly. In particular, the pay-offs to a bank i, located in a regular network g of
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degree k, faced with a research profile e, are
Πi(g
k) =
[a− c+ ei(n− k) + ej(n− k)k − el(k + 1)(n− k − 1)]2
b (n+ 1)2
− θ e2i (13)
Note that we use the symmetry for the connected and non-connected firms with respect
to firm i, respectively. From the first order condition and invoking symmetry, i.e.,
ei = ej = el = e(g
k) and solving for e(gk) we obtain the equilibrium effort level:
e∗(gk) =
(a− c) (n− k)[
b (n+ 1)2 − (k + 1) (n− k)] (14)
Our first observation is that this equilibrium level of R&D effort is declining (at least
locally) in the level of collaborative activity k. We establish this by showing that
∂e∗(gk)
∂k
=
(a− c) [(n− k)2 − b θ (n+ 1)2][
b (n+ 1)2 − (k + 1) (n− k)]2 < 0 (15)
To examine the effect of the number of connections on the nature of cost reduction we
substitute (14) into the cost structure (1) and we are left that equilibrium costs are
expressed as following:
c∗(gk) =
c b θ (n+ 1)2 − a (k + 1) (n− k)[
b (n+ 1)2 − (k + 1) (n− k)] (16)
We observe that cost are decreasing at low level of connections and then increasing at
higher level of collaborative links. Thus, minimum costs are attained at an intermediate
level of collaboration. This result is obtained formally by calculating the derivative of
equilibrium costs with respect to the degree.
∂c∗(gk)
∂k
=
(2k + 1− n) (a− c) b θ (n+ 1)2[
b (n+ 1)2 − (k + 1) (n− k)]2 (17)
It is easy to see that an increase in the level of collaborations reduces the cost of the
banks if and only if k < (n− 1)/2. Thus, cost reduction exhibits a nonmonotonic
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relationship with respect to the density of the network.
Finally, the profits attained by a bank in a symmetric network of degree k can be
obtained by substituting the equilibrium level of effort into (13):
Πi(g
k) =
θ (a− c)2 [b θ (n+ 1)2 − (n− k)2][
b (n+ 1)2 − (k + 1) (n− k)]2 (18)
Profits are initially increasing and then eventually falling with respect to the degree of
the number of links (degree). We establish this by taking the derivative of equilibrium
profits with respect to degree.
∂Πi(g
k)
∂k
=
θ (a− c)2 (n− k) [(b θ (n+ 1)2 − (n− k)2)+ b θ (n+ 1)2 (n− 2k − 1)][
b (n+ 1)2 − (k + 1) (n− k)]3 (19)
Note that the denominator is positive. In the numerator all the expressions are positive
as long as k < (n− 1)/2. This implies that equilibrium profits are increasing in degree
when the number is connections is small.
The following result, due to ? summarizes the analysis on symmetric network of
collaboration in oligopoly markets.
Proposition 2 Consider a homogeneous good market where firms compete in quantities
and suppose that banks are located in a regular network of collaboration. The following
network effects arise. (i) Research effort of a firm is decreasing in the level of
collaborative activity. (ii) Relationship between cost reduction and the level of
collaborative activity is non-monotonic. Cost are initially decreasing and then increasing
with respect to degree. (iii) Profits are initially increasing but eventually falling with
respect to degree.
Proof. See Appendix.
This section has shown that in homogeneous good market where firms compete a la´
Cournot and where banks are located in a regular network of collaboration, profits are
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maximized at an intermediate level of collaborative activity. In the next section, we
present an application of these models of networks collaboration using a revised version
of the Monti-Klein model of banking or the industrial organization model of banking.
3 Application: The Monti-Klein Model of Banking
in a Network Approach
Information is one of the basic inputs needed by a bank to survival in the marketplace.
Unfortunately, in general the data needed to screen credit applications and to monitor
borrowers are not freely available to banks. Collecting and processing information
efficiently in screening credit applicants and in monitoring their performance is costly.
At the screening stage, lenders need information about borrowers characteristics,
including the riskiness of their investment projects. To the extent that a bank does not
have such information, it faces adverse selection problems in its lending activity.
Adverse selection arises when some information about the borrowers characteristics
remain hidden to the lender (hidden information), and can lead to an inefficient
allocation of credit, for instance to its rationing or to an increase in the cost of
managing certain volume of loans.
One mechanism a bank can follow to reduce this information asymmetry problem (and
the marginal cost of producing a loan) is to invest in some sort of cost-reducing
technology. It can acquire the information about customers that it does not possess by
spending resources to collect information about them. At the screening stage, it can
visit the credit applicants plants, talk to their managers, and study their business plans.
However, it is often cheaper and more effective to acquire information by exchanging it
with other lenders. Therefore, we consider an oligopoly market with (ex ante) identical
banks. Prior to market interaction, each bank has an opportunity to form pair-wise
collaborative links with other banks. The purpose of these ties is to share credit
information with goal of reducing the information asymmetry cost. The collection of
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pair-wise links between the banks defines a network of collaboration.
Given a collaboration network, banks unilaterally choose a (costly) level of effort in
research and development, R&D , aimed at reducing the intermediation costs. The level
of effort of different banks and the network of collaboration define the effective costs of
the different banks in the market. Given these costs, banks operate in the market by
setting quantities. We consider two types of market interaction: in the first case, banks
operate in independent markets, while in the second case, they compete a la´ Cournot in
a homogeneous-service market.
We model banking activity as the production of deposit and loan services. Banking
technology is represented by a cost function C(D,L) interpreted as the cost of
managing a volume D of deposits and a volume L of loans.
3.1 Independent Markets Case
An imperfect competition model is probably more appropriate to analyse the banking
industry since the assumption of perfect competition may not seem really appropriate
for the this sector, where there are important barriers to entry. This discussion first
studies the Monti-Klein model, which in its simplest version is poles apart from the
perfectly competitive model because it considers a monopolistic bank.
There are n different banks (or regions), indexed by i = 1, ..., n with the same cost
function that satisfies the usual assumptions of convexity (which implies decreasing
returns to scale) and regularity (C is twice differentiable). The inverse demand function
for loans is given by rL(L), with derivative r
′
L(L) < 0, and the inverse supply function of
deposits is rD, with derivative r
′
D(D) > 0. We also assume that borrowers might apply
for loans in one or more banks (regions) at the same time.
Assume that the bank i takes the interbank rate r as given, either because it is fixed by
the Central Bank or because it is determined by the equilibrium rate on international
capital markets. The coefficient α of compulsory reserves may be used as a policy
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instrument through which the Central Bank tries to influence the quantity of money in
circulation in the economy.
In its more general version, the bank’s decision problem is to maximize its profits given
by the following expression:
Πi(Li, Di) = [rL(Li)− r]Li + [r(1− α)− rD(Di)]Di − Ci(Li, Di) (20)
The bank’s profit is basically the sum of the intermediation margins on loans and on
deposits minus management costs. We assume that Π(L,D) is strictly concave in order
for the maximum of pii to be characterized by the following first-order conditions,
∂Πi
∂Li
= r′L(Li)Li + rL − r −
∂C(Li, Di)
∂Li
= 0 (21)
∂Πi
∂Di
= −r′D(Di)Di + r(1− α)− rD −
∂C(Li, Di)
∂Di
= 0 (22)
For simplicity in the exposition, we assume that management costs are additive for
bank i. In particular, the cost is linear in L and D, i.e., C(D,L) = CLi L+ C
D
i D. The
separability of the cost function leads to the following important result:
Lemma 1 If management costs are additive, the bank’s decision problem is separable.
In others words, the optimal volume of deposits (and the corresponding deposit rate) is
independent of the characteristics of the loan market, and the optimal volume of loans
(and and the corresponding loan rate) is independent of the characteristics of the deposit
market.
Proof. The lemma can be easily proved by looking at the first order conditions (21) and
(22). Since management costs are additive, the bank’s decision problem is separable.
Formally, ∂C(Li, Di)/∂Li = ∂C(Li)/∂Li if ∂C(Li, Di)/∂Li∂Di = 0. QED.
Further, the version of the Monti-Klein model considered here refers to a monopolistic
commercial bank that operates in region i confronted with a linear downward-sloping
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inverse demand for loans, rL(L) = aL − bLL and a linear upward-sloping supply of
deposits, rD(D) = aD + bDD. The discussion here is in line with the more traditional
view of a banks buying funds from depositors and selling them to borrowers. It
therefore speaks of a demand for loans by borrowers and a supply of deposits by
households.Indeed, granting a loan is equivalent to buying a security issued by the
borrower. Similarly, collecting deposits is like issuing securities. The bank’s decision
variables are L (the amount of loans) and D (the amount of deposits), since its level of
equity is assumed to be given.
Now, under these specification, the bank’s profit equation (20) can be re-expressed as
Πi(L,D) =
[
aL − bLLi − r − CLi
]
Li +
[
r(1− α)− aD − bDDi − CDi
]
Di (23)
Next, we assume that collaborations between banks operating in independent markets
are possible. Recall, that the purpose of these ties is to share credit information with
goal of reducing the information asymmetry cost that arises when some information
about the borrowers characteristics remain hidden to the lender, leading to an
inefficient allocation of credit. Then, the research effort by an individual bank is
directly related with the acquisition of information about borrowers that it does not
possess. However, collecting information (research effort) is costly for the bank.
Formally, we use the following specification Z(ei) = θ e
2
i where θ > 0 and sufficiently
large to ensure bank decision problems have interior solutions. Then, the profit function
reflecting these specifications is given by
Πi(L,D) =
[
aL − bLL− r − CLi
]
Li +
[
r(1− α)− aD − bDD − CDi
]
Di − θ e2i (24)
In this setting, research effort has no implications for the level of market
competitiveness of potential collaborators. Therefore, we isolate the pure effects of
collaboration. We find that collaboration between banks increases the level of effort by
individual banks. Moreover, every pair of banks has an incentive to form links, and the
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complete network is the unique stable and efficient network.
Recall that a particular network architecture will arise after all the banks in the market
have decided how to undertake their cost-reducing investment projects, either in
isolation or in collaboration with others banks. Now, given some network g, every bank
chooses unilaterally an R&D effort level, ei, with the goal of lowering its own marginal
cost of managing the loans. Formally,
CLi (e/g) = γL −
ei + ∑
j∈Ni(g)
ej
 (25)
In this specification, marginal cost of i decreases linearly in the number of banks
belonging to the same coalition as i. Observe that the total cost reduction for some
bank i comes from its own research effort ei, and the research effort of others banks.
Finally, we assume that the marginal cost of managing the deposits are small and
constant, i.e. CDi = CD. In others words, the research efforts are focussed to reduce the
marginal cost of managing the loans.
Market outcome. Given a network g, and the R&D efforts levels {ei(g)}i∈N , banks
choose quantities to maximize their monopoly profits given by expression (24).
Standard derivations show that the equilibrium volume of loans and deposits are given
by the following expressions respectively,
L∗i (g) =
[aL − r − CLi (g)]
2bL
(26)
D∗i (g) =
[r(1− α)− CD − aD]
2bD
(27)
which yield the following profit function after we had plugged them back into (24).
Πi(g) =
[
aL − r − CLi (g)
]2
4bL
+
[r(1− α)− CD − aD]2
4bD
− θ e2i (g)
∀i = 1, . . . , n(28)
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For comparison purposes with the theoretical model presented in section 1, we rewrite
the previous equation as
Πi(g) =
[
aL − cLi (g)
]2
4bL
− θ e2i (g) + ∆D
∀i = 1, . . . , n(29)
where ∆D = [r(1− α)− CDi − aD]2/4bD can be ignored from the analysis that follows.
Recall that when management costs are separable the problem of choosing the optimal
volume of loans can be found independently of the characteristics of the market for
deposits. We have also defined cLi (g) = r + C
L
i (g) = r + γL − (ei +
∑
j∈Ni(g) ej). Now, if
we define cL = r + γL we are left with the same marginal cost structure presented in the
theoretical model in section 1, that is, cLi (g) = cL − (ei +
∑
j∈Ni(g) ej).
In this way, we can restate all of the results that we found in the theoretical model
presented in section 1 and some additional results concerning monetary policy.
R&D efforts. In the second stage of the game, banks choose their R&D efforts to
maximize the reduced-form profits (29). The costs ci(g) depend on the effort levels
undertaken by the banks, which in turn are a function of the existing network.
Therefore, using (25) and the fact we consider only symmetric networks of degree k, we
obtain
Πi(g
k) =
[
aL − cL + ei +
∑
l∈Ni(g) el
]2
4bL
− θ e2i (g) + ∆D
∀i = 1, . . . , n(30)
We observe in the expression above that the profits of bank i are a non-decreasing and
convex function of the efforts of banks that have some collaborative agreement with
bank i. In other words, the efforts of collaborating banks are strategic complements.
From the first order condition, and by invoking symmetry, we obtain
e∗i (g
k) =
(aL − cL)
[4bLθ − (k + 1)] ∀i = 1, . . . , n (31)
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We can also analyse the nature of the equilibrium marginal cost reduction by
substituting (31) into the cost structure cLi = cL − (k + 1)e∗i and obtain
c∗i (g
k) = cL − (aL − cL) (k + 1)
[4bLθ − (k + 1)] ∀i = 1, . . . , n (32)
Finally, by substituting the equilibrium level of efforts obtained in (31) into (30) we can
examine the nature of equilibrium profits
Π∗i (g
k) =
(aL − cL)2 θ (4bLθ − 1)
[4bLθ − (k + 1)]2
+ ∆D ∀i = 1, . . . , n (33)
Proposition 3 Assume banks operate in independent markets (or regions). Then
individual research efforts and profits are increasing with respect to the level of
collaborative activity while marginal costs of managing loans are decreasing.
Proof. See Proposition 2.
Our framework can also be used to study the effects of an increase in the level of credit
sharing information among banks on the net position of the bank in the interbank
market. Recall that Mi is the net position of the bank i on the interbank market, and is
given by,
M∗i = (1− α)D∗i − L∗i ∀i = 1, . . . , n (34)
Proposition 4 Assume banks operate in independent markets (or regions). Then the
volume of the net position of the bank i in the interbank markets falls when there is an
increase in the level of collaborative activity among banks.
Proof. Let’s begin with the optimal volume of loans given by L∗i = [aL − CLi ]2/2bL. It is
easy to see that ∂L∗i /∂k = −(1/2bL)∂CLi /∂k. Now, from Proposition 3, we know that
the sign of the derivative ∂CLi /∂k < 0, which implies ∂L
∗
i /∂k > 0. Therefore,
∂M∗i /∂k < 0. QED.
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The intuition behind this result can be explained in the following terms. A commercial
bank i can reduced the marginal cost of managing the loans by increasing the number
of alliances or links with other banks. In particular, a bank now can increase the
volume of loans funded with its on deposits. Thus, overall the increment in the sharing
of credit information gives each bank more independence in the sense that it relies less
on the interbank market to fund their daily operations.
Monetary Policy and Banking Collaborative Networks
In this section we consider the effects of monetary policy on the incentives of banks to
share credit information (to form collaborative links) in the independent market case.
Modern monetary policy is more accurately described as interventions on the rate r at
which the Central Bank refinances commercial banks (assumed equal to the interbank
rate). Another policy instrument through which the Monetary Authority tries to
influence the level of credit in the economy is the coefficient of compulsory reserves α.
In our framework it is easy to see how an anti-cyclical monetary policy affect the
incentive of commercial banks to share credit information. For example, the Central
Bank may increase the coefficient of compulsory reserves α in good states, and
decreases it in bad states.
Proposition 5 Assume banks operate in independent markets (or regions). If the
Central Bank increases the coefficient of compulsory reserves α, with the goal of
contracting the level of credit in the economy, then commercial banks will react by
increasing the number of collaborative activity among them.
Proof. Start with the equilibrium profits expression given by (33). Now, by the implicit
function theorem we know that
∂k
∂α
= −∂Π
∗
i /∂α
∂Π∗i /∂k
(35)
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We have already shown in Proposition 3 that ∂Π∗i /∂k is positive. Now it is relatively
easy to see from the equilibrium profit function that ∂Π∗i /∂α is negative. Therefore,
∂k/∂α > 0. QED.
Oligopolistic Banking and Sharing Credit Information Alliances
We extend the analysis to the case of n banks that interact within an oligopolistic
banking framework. Basically, we reinterpret the Monti-Klein model as a model of
imperfect Cournot competition between a finite number n of banks. Collaborations at
the pre-competition stage between banks operating in the same market are aimed to
reduced the high level of information asymmetry inherent in credit markets. Like in the
previous case, a bank’s R&D effort lowers the marginal cost of managing loans of its
collaborators, which in this setting makes them more competitive. This reduces the
marginal returns to investing in R&D as additional links are formed. This analysis
illustrates how this competition effect influences the private and social incentives to
collaborate. Again, we assume that the research effort by an individual bank is directly
related with the acquisition of information about borrowers that it does not possess.
Then, the profit function reflecting these specifications is given by
Πi(Li, Di) =
[
aL − bLLi − bL
∑
j 6=i
Lj − cLi
]
Li +
[
cDi − aD − bDDi − bD
∑
j 6=i
Dj
]
Di − θ e2i
(36)
where cLi = r + C
L
i and c
D
i = r(1− α)− CDi .
Market outcome. In the market competition stage, we note that given a cost
configuration of banks,
{
CLi (g)
}
i∈N , the optimal volume of loans for bank i in a
homogeneous-product oligopoly is given by
L∗i (g) =
1
(n+ 1) bL
[
aL − n cLi (g) +
∑
j 6=i
cLj (g)
]
∀i = 1, . . . , n (37)
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D∗i (g) =
1
(n+ 1) bD
[
n cDi (g)−
∑
j 6=i
cDj (g)− aD
]
∀i = 1, . . . , n (38)
Substituting for the equilibrium value of Li(g) and DD(g) in the profit function (3), we
are left that the profits of the Cournot competitors are given by the following expression:
Πi =
[
aL − n cLi +
∑
j 6=i c
L
j
]2
bL (n+ 1)
2 +
[
n cDi −
∑
j 6=i c
D
j − aD
]2
bD (n+ 1)
2 − θ e2i (g) (39)
Let’s define ∆D =
[
n cDi −
∑
j 6=i c
D
j − aD
]2
/bD (n+ 1)
2. Further, since individual
research efforts do not affect the marginal cost of deposits, we can assume they are
constant, i.e. cDi = c
D
j = C
D for all j 6= i, which left ∆D =
[
CD − aD
]2
/bD (n+ 1)
2.
Then, we can rewrite the previous profit function as,
Πi =
[
aL − n cLi +
∑
j 6=i c
L
j
]2
bL (n+ 1)
2 − θ e2i (g) + ∆D (40)
Similar derivations like in section 1, allow us to express the payoffs in terms of research
efforts directly. In particular, the payoffs to a bank i, located in a regular network g of
degree k, faced with a research profile e, are
Πi(g
k) =
[aL − cL + ei(n− k) + ej(n− k)k − el(k + 1)(n− k − 1)]2
bL (n+ 1)
2 − θ e2i + ∆D (41)
Note that we use the symmetry for the connected and non-connected banks with
respect to bank i, respectively. From the first order condition and invoking symmetry,
i.e., ei = ej = el = e(g
k) and solving for e(gk) we obtain the equilibrium effort level:
e∗(gk) =
(a− cL) (n− k)[
bL (n+ 1)
2 − (k + 1) (n− k)] (42)
Our first observation is that this equilibrium level of R&D effort is declining (at least
locally) in the level of collaborative activity k. We establish this by showing that
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∂e∗(gk)
∂k
=
(aL − c)
[
(n− k)2 − bL θ (n+ 1)2
][
bL (n+ 1)
2 − (k + 1) (n− k)]2 (43)
To examine the effect of the number of connections on the nature of cost reduction we
substitute (42) into the cost structure (1) and we are left that equilibrium costs are
expressed as following:
c∗L(g
k) =
cL bL θ (n+ 1)
2 − aL (k + 1) (n− k)[
bL (n+ 1)
2 − (k + 1) (n− k)] (44)
We observe that cost are decreasing at low level of connections and then increasing at
higher level of collaborative links. Thus, minimum costs are attained at an intermediate
level of collaboration. This result is obtained formally by calculating the derivative of
equilibrium costs with respect to the degree:
∂c∗L(g
k)
∂k
=
(2k + 1− n) (aL − cL) bL θ (n+ 1)2[
bL (n+ 1)
2 − (k + 1) (n− k)]2 (45)
It is easy to see that an increase in the level of collaborations reduces the cost of the
banks if and only if k < (n− 1)/2. Thus, cost reduction exhibits a non-monotonic
relationship with respect to the density of the network.
Finally, the profits attained by a bank in a symmetric network of degree k can be
obtained by substituting the equilibrium level of effort and costs into (39):
Πi(g
k) =
θ (aL − cL)2
[
bL θ (n+ 1)
2 − (n− k)2][
bL (n+ 1)
2 − (k + 1) (n− k)]2 + ∆D (46)
Profits are initially increasing and then eventually falling with respect to the degree of
the number of links (degree). We establish this by taking the derivative of equilibrium
profits with respect to degree.
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∂Πi(g
k)
∂k
=
θ (aL − cL)2 (n− k)
[(
bL θ (n+ 1)
2 − (n− k)2)+ bL θ (n+ 1)2 (n− 2k − 1)][
bL (n+ 1)
2 − (k + 1) (n− k)]3
(47)
Note that the denominator is positive. In the numerator all the expressions are positive
as long as k < (n− 1)/2. This implies that equilibrium profits are increasing in degree
when the number is connections is small.
The following result summarizes the analysis on symmetric network of collaboration in
banking oligopoly markets.
Proposition 6 Consider a homogeneous loan market where banks compete in volume
and suppose that banks are located in a regular network of collaboration. The following
network effects arise. (i) Research effort of a bank is decreasing in the level of
collaborative activity. (ii)relationship between cost reduction and the level of
collaborative activity is non-monotonic. Cost are initially decreasing and then increasing
with respect to degree. (iii) Profits are initially increasing but eventually falling with
respect to degree.
The main implication of this section is to show that in homogeneous loan market where
banks compete a la Cournot and where banks are located in a regular network of
collaboration, profits are maximized at an intermediate level of sharing credit
information.
Monetary Policy and Banking Collaborative Networks
In this section we reconsider the effects of monetary policy on the incentives of banks to
share credit information in the case of banks competing in a oligopolistic market. From
the previous analysis, we concluded that bank’s profits are maximized at an
intermediate level of sharing credit information. In particular, we found that at low level
of connections, that is for k < (n− 1)/2, profits were increasing. On the other hand,
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when k > (n− 1)/2 the bank would be too connected and profits will be decreasing.
The Monetary Authority can influence the degree of connection of the banking system
by altering the coefficient of compulsory reserves α. If at some point in time, the
Central Bank observes that the level of connections of the banking system is too low, it
could increase α to provide more incentives to the banks to form additional links of
collaborations. The following proposition summarizes this idea.
Proposition 7 Assume banks operate in oligopolistic markets. If the Central Bank
increases the coefficient of compulsory reserves α, then commercial banks will react by
increasing(decreasing) the number of collaborative activity if and only if
k < (>)(n− 1)/2.
Proof. Start with the equilibrium profits expression given by (33). Now, by the implicit
function theorem we know that
∂k
∂α
= −∂Π
∗
i /∂α
∂Π∗i /∂k
(48)
We have already shown in Proposition 6 that ∂Π∗i /∂k is positive (negative) if and only
if k < (>)(n− 1)/2. Now, it is relatively easy to see from the equilibrium profit
function that ∂Π∗i /∂α is negative. Therefore, ∂k/∂α > (<)0 if and only if
k < (>)(n− 1)/2. QED.
4 Conclusion
The literature has long stressed that banks face adverse selection or moral hazard
problems in its lending activity leading to an inefficient allocation of credit. Screening
credit applications may help to reduce the adverse selection problem and monitoring
borrowers may help to ease the moral hazard problem, yet the production of
information is costly.
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A cheaper and more effective way to acquire information is by exchanging it with other
lenders. However, the type, quality, quantity of data available, and information-sharing
mechanism finds a limit in the set of legal provisions designed to protect individual
privacy and vary greatly from country to country, giving rise to different types of
“credit bureaus” or the more complex “syndicated loans”.
In this article, we model the banking industry within a network framework that provide
us with some useful insights on the optimal number of credit sharing information
alliances individual banks should establish to maximize expected profits, taking into
account the different market structure in which they interact.
We find that if banks operate in independent markets,then individual research effort is
increasing in the level of collaborative activity. Cost reduction and social welfare are
maximized under the complete network, which is also the unique strategically stable
network. These results imply that it is optimal that each bank shares credit information
with all the other banks. This is in line with the tendency of credit bureaus - that were
set up originally by small coalitions of lenders as cooperative arrangements - to be
totally integrated in a few big credit agencies.
In the other hand, we find that if banks are Cournot competitors, in a homogeneous
loan market, where banks compete in volume and banks are located in a regular
network of collaboration, the following network effects arise: (i) Research effort of a
bank is decreasing in the level of collaborative activity. (ii)relationship between cost
reduction and the level of collaborative activity is non-monotonic. Cost are initially
decreasing and then increasing with respect to degree. (iii) Profits are initially
increasing but eventually falling with respect to degree. These results imply that banks
profits are maximized at an intermediate level of sharing credit information and provide
an alternative explanation why we observe syndicated loans even in countries in which
formal sharing information systems are well established.
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